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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, IMMIGRATION SANCTUARY, 
AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR REPRODUC-
TIVE AND LGBTQ RIGHTS
LAURA KEELEY*
Abstract
The idea that people in the United States are free to exercise their religion has exist-
ed as long as the country itself. Presently, in the aftermath of the presidential election of 
Donald Trump, there has been renewed interest among religious congregations in provid-
ing sanctuary for undocumented immigrants at risk of deportation. This note considers 
the idea that potential religious liberty claims could be made by faith-based communities 
to provide sanctuary. It pays particular attention to potential unintended consequences 
those claims could have for reproductive and LGBTQ rights. This note proposes that any 
religious liberty claims made in the name of sanctuary should 1) be evaluated in the do-
main of antidiscrimination law and not analogized to much broader “conscience clauses”; 
2) advocate for a narrower construction of religious liberty jurisprudence and religious 
liberty-protecting statutes; and 3) push courts to evaluate the sincerity of sincerely held 
religious beliefs.
INTRODUCTION
Jeanette Vizguerra, a forty-five-year-old mother of four, walked into a Colorado church 
in February 2017, a few weeks after the inauguration of President Donald Trump. Vizguer-
ra went back to her Colorado home—eighty-six days later. 
Vizguerra spent three months between two Denver churches, First Unitarian Soci-
ety and First Baptist, avoiding Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers.1 
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1  Noelle Phillips, Jeanette Vizguerra leaves sanctuary after 86 days avoiding immigration authorities, 
denver post (May 12, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/12/jeanette-vizguerra-arturo-hernandez-
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Vizguerra, an undocumented immigrant, has lived in the United States since 1997. Three 
of her children—ages six, ten, and twelve at the time—were born in the United States.2 Her 
adult daughter has Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status3 and a two-year-
old son. Vizguerra had been granted multiple stays of removal, postponing her deportation, 
since pleading guilty to using a fake social security number in an attempt to work in 2009.4 
Her lawyer applied for a renewal of her stay on December 6, 2016, but her stay of removal 
expired on February 7, 2017.5 Rather than going to a scheduled meeting with ICE officials, 
Vizguerra went to church.6 She declared sanctuary at First Unitarian Society. After eighty-
garcia-stay-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/KWF7-U2D9].
2  Kieran Nicholson, Mother of four fears deportation, declares sanctuary at Denver church, denver 
post (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/15/mother-deportation-sanctuary-at-denver-
church/ [https://perma.cc/W7NQ-A3RF].
3  DACA was established under President Barack Obama on June 15, 2012, as then-Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a memorandum entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,” establishing the DACA program. 
deFerred aCtion For Childhood arrivals (daCa), https://www.dhs.gov/topic/deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/9VF8-G4CM]. Certain people who came to the United States as children 
(prior to age 16) and met several guidelines could request consideration of deferred action for a period of 
two years, subject to renewal. They were also eligible for work authorization. Deferred action is a use of 
prosecutorial discretion to defer removal action against an individual for a certain period of time. Deferred 
action does not provide lawful status. Consideration oF deFerred aCtion For Childhood arrivals (daCa), 
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/
BMC7-8544]. DACA has been a target of the Trump administration. On September 5, 2017, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions announced that President Trump was rescinding DACA, which meant nearly 800,000 young 
adults who had been brought to the United States as children would become eligible for deportation as of 
early March 2018. Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on 
Congress to Act, n.Y. times (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-
dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/3BDK-TUN2]. On January 9, 2018, Judge William Alsup of 
the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction ordering the Trump administration to 
“maintain the DACA program on a nationwide basis on the same terms and conditions as were in effect 
before the rescission on September 5, 2017, including allowing DACA enrollees to renew their enrollment.” 
Regents of Univ. of California v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2018 WL 
339144, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018). No new applications for DACA status are being accepted at this 
time. 
4  Nicholson, supra note 2; Joel Rose, Sanctuary Churches Brace For Clash With Trump Administration, 
NPR (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/16/515510996/colorado-church-offers-immigrant-
sanctuary-from-deportation [https://perma.cc/5TWY-BLKD].
5  Nicholson, supra note 2.
6  Id.
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six days, she was granted another stay of deportation, valid through March 15, 2019.7
For First Unitarian Society’s Reverend Mike Morran, the duty to shelter Vizguerra was 
a moral one. “It is our position as a people of faith that this is sacred and faithful work,” he 
said at the press conference in which Vizguerra announced her decision to seek sanctuary.8 
The fact that offering sanctuary to Vizguerra and helping her evade immigration authorities 
violated federal law did not deter Morran from fulfilling what he saw as his moral duty.9 
Vizguerra is not the only undocumented immigrant who has sought sanctuary rather 
than face deportation, and the two churches in Denver are part of a much larger network of 
faith communities willing to defy the law to help this population.10 More than 800 religious 
congregations—up from about 400 pre-election—in the United States are engaged in sup-
porting the sanctuary movement in some way.11
The federal government does not have to respect a claim for sanctuary, though ICE 
official policy calls for avoiding enforcement actions, like arrests and searches, at “sensi-
tive locations” like schools, hospitals, and places of worship.12 There is no guarantee the 
7  Phillips, supra note 1.
8  Rose, supra note 4.
9  8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) criminalizes any person who “knowing or in reckless disregard 
of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, 
harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any 
place” or engages in a conspiracy or aids and abets any of the previous acts.
10  See, e.g., Jenn Fields, Colorado now has more immigrants in church sanctuary than any other state, 
denver post (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/25/colorado-undocumented-immigrants-
in-church-sanctuary/ [https://perma.cc/52MB-82PV] (listing five people in Colorado, four people in Arizona, 
and three each in New Mexico, North Carolina, Illinois, and Massachusetts as known sanctuary seekers in 
religious spaces at the time); Martha Quillin, The US ordered this undocumented worker out. Now a Raleigh 
church has taken him in, raleiGh news & observer (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/
politics-government/article178135416.html [https://perma.cc/MN37-TG2R] (detailing Eliseo Jimenez’s 
sanctuary in Umstead Park United Church of Christ in Raleigh, N.C.).
11  Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era Immigrant Sanctuaries, n.Y. 
times (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/us/houses-of-worship-poised-to-serve-as-trump-
era-immigrant-sanctuaries.html [https://perma.cc/CH79-L746]; Dwyer Gunn, The sanctuary movement: how 
religious groups are sheltering the undocumented, Guardian (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2017/feb/08/sanctuary-movement-undocumented-immigrants-america-trump-obama [https://perma.
cc/S3VP-5C44].
12  u.s. immiGration & Customs enF’t, poliCY no. 10029.2, enForCement aCtions at or FoCused on 
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Trump administration will continue to follow the policy.13 Given the unpredictability of the 
current administration, more undocumented immigrants might opt for sanctuary in a house 
of worship rather than risk deportation with ICE. 
The intersection of religious liberty and immigration pits two of the Trump administra-
tion’s prominent policy goals against each other. The administration has issued executive 
orders focused on both the promotion of religious liberty14 and increased immigration en-
forcement and deportation.15 The idea of freedom of religious exercise in the United States 
has existed as long as the country itself. And we have been debating exactly what that 
means for just as long.16 Opinions on the place of religion in secular society have changed 
significantly over time. In 1971, Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court when he said, 
“The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the 
family, and institutions of private choice,” such as churches, mosques, and temples.17 This 
view has eroded over time, with religious liberties seeping further and further into secular 
spaces.18 
This Note considers the idea that potential religious liberty claims could be made by 
faith-based communities to provide sanctuary for undocumented immigrants and pays par-
sensitive loCations (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XK4H-A6K9].
13  Indeed, on at least one occasion ICE officers disregarded the policy, as they arrested a ten-year-old 
with cerebral palsy after her emergency gallbladder surgery finished. See Vivian Yee & Caitlin Dickerson, 
10-Year-Old Immigrant Is Detained After Agents Stop Her on Way to Surgery, n.Y. times (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/us/girl-cerebral-palsy-detained-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/
G4HY-ERNJ]. 
14  Establishment of a White House Faith and Opportunity Initiative, 83 Fed. Reg. 20715 (May 8, 2018); 
Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017).
15  Affording Congress an Opportunity To Address Family Separation, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 (June 25, 
2018); Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
16  See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 rutGers J.l. & reliGion 139, 140 (2009) 
[hereinafter Laycock, Religious Exemption] (noting that debates swirled in the seventeenth century as the 
government exempted Quakers from swearing oaths).
17  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
18  See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that the 
Missouri Department of Natural Resources policy of not granting government funds to religious organizations 
violated the free exercise rights of a church); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (holding 
that town’s practice of opening board meetings with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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ticular attention to potential unintended consequences those claims could have in the areas 
of reproductive and LGBTQ rights. Arguments to justify religious liberty in the name of 
sanctuary could be used in the future by different parties in attempts to limit reproductive 
rights19 and discriminate against LGBTQ persons.20 The announcement by President Trump 
of the creation of a new oversight entity in the Department of Health and Human Services, 
the Conscience and Religious Freedom Division, is an example of this religious-liber-
ty-as-discrimination phenomenon.21 This Note proposes that any religious liberty claims 
made in the name of sanctuary should 1) be evaluated in the domain of antidiscrimination 
law and not analogized to much broader “conscience clauses”;22 2) advocate for a narrow-
er construction of religious liberty jurisprudence and religious liberty-protecting statutes, 
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA); and 3) push courts to evaluate the 
sincerity of sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Part I establishes the First Amendment protections afforded to religion through the 
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, which also act to make sure that no 
one religion receives preferential treatment to others. It then turns to the relevant history 
of the original sanctuary movement of the 1980s and the subsequent renewal in interest 
19  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding contraceptive mandate 
imposes substantial burden on religious exercise of for-profit closely held corporations); Moral Exemptions 
and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 47838 (Oct. 13, 2017); Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47792 (Oct. 13, 2017) (rolling back the Affordable 
Care Act’s contraception mandate).
20  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (vacating 
lower court ruling that the First Amendment does not grant a retail bakery the right to violate Colorado’s 
equal-service requirement by refusing to sell a wedding cake of any kind to any same-sex couple); Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (vacating and remanding lower court decision, in light 
of Masterpiece Cakeshop, that used rational basis review to deny free exercise challenge to Washington’s 
neutral and generally applicable antidiscrimination law); Complaint at 1, Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 
706 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (challenging the state’s practice of permitting state-funded child placement agencies 
to use religious criteria to turn away lesbian and gay prospective foster and adoptive parents).
21  The move expands the right of health care workers to object to performing procedures like abortion and 
gender reassignment surgery. It is not hard to imagine a doctor denying a lesbian couple fertility treatments 
or pharmacists refusing to fill prescriptions for contraceptives. See Robert Pear & Jeremy W. Peters, Trump 
Gives Health Workers New Religious Liberty Protections, n.Y. times (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/01/18/us/health-care-office-abortion-contraception.html [https://perma.cc/562V-Y7XH]. 
22  Conscience clauses allow doctors and other health professionals to avoid providing or assisting in 
reproductive activities, most commonly sterilization, abortion, and contraception. See Nelson Tebbe, Religion 
and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 harv. l. & pol’Y rev. 25, 42 (2015) [hereinafter Tebbe, Religion and 
Marriage]; infra quote accompanying note 243.
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in protecting religious liberties in the 1990s after the Supreme Court’s decision in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.23 This upwelling of interest resulted in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a widely supported bipartisan effort that codified the idea 
that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government shows that 
application of the burden is “the least restrictive means” to further a “compelling govern-
mental interest.”24 A compelling government interest is protecting “third-parties”—“per-
sons who derive no benefit from an exemption because they do not believe or engage in 
the exempted religious practices”25—from burdens as a result of an exemption.26 This Note 
then chronicles the subsequent modifications to RFRA, including the Court’s decision that 
it was unconstitutional as applied to the states,27 and outlines the status of religious freedom 
jurisprudence now. RFRA applies to the federal government, and the twenty-one states 
that passed their own RFRA-like laws28 have a similar governing standard. Otherwise, the 
Court’s free exercise line of cases, including Smith, remains the relevant standard.29 RFRA 
was universally praised at the time it was passed, but that support splintered a few years 
later as the idea of marriage equality for LGBTQ persons began to gather more support 
23  494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability not itself directed against religion—
in other words, judges no longer needed to engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens 
imposed by facially constitutional laws because the fact that the law was constitutional barred any free 
exercise challenge).
24  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b)(2) (2012).
25  Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby’s 
Puzzling Footnote 37, in the rise oF Corporate reliGious libertY 323, 323 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad 
Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).
26  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (“It is certainly true that in applying RFRA courts 
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries. That 
consideration will often inform the analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the availability of a 
less restrictive means of advancing that interest.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Gedicks & Van 
Tasell, supra note 25, at 327.
27  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
28  See infra note 136.
29  See Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 16, at 142–43 (“Smith is still the law of the federal Free 
Exercise Clause”). It is possible that a state’s judicial decision has mandated a standard falling between Smith 
and RFRA for evaluating religious exemption claims, but an analysis of the state of religious liberty law in 
each of the fifty states is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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and opponents of marriage equality began using claims of religious freedom to resist it.30 
Part II looks at how RFRA has developed into a sword to attack reproductive and 
LGBTQ rights. To do so, this Note closely examines the decision in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby,31 which brought an unprecedented expansion to RFRA’s protection by holding that 
closely held32 for-profit companies were “persons” that could have sincerely held religious 
beliefs covered under RFRA. The decision, which allowed those companies to claim an ex-
emption from the Affordable Care Act of 2010’s contraception mandate,33 set the ground-
work for further erosion of birth control coverage for women and provided a blueprint for 
businesses to challenge antidiscrimination provisions protecting LGBTQ persons. Of all 
the issues with the Hobby Lobby decision, the Court gutting the third-party burden analysis 
of its importance could be the most damaging going forward. By discussing, in detail. the 
reasoning and implications of Hobby Lobby, this Note provides an example of a religious 
liberty claim extended too far, and Hobby Lobby should be fresh in the minds of any liti-
gator or activist preparing to use religious liberty claims to attempt to help undocumented 
immigrants. A case decided by the Supreme Court in June 2018, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission,34 threatens to further expand religious freedom in the 
future at the expense of third parties and allow for-profit companies to refuse to serve the 
LGBTQ community. 
Part III offers a proposed framework, as stated above, for any potential religious liberty 
claims made in the name of sanctuary. Such claims are not merely theoretical. An Arizo-
na man volunteering with No More Deaths, a humanitarian organization affiliated with 
the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson, has asserted RFRA as a defense35 to crimi-
30  See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 harv. l. rev. 154, 159–160 (2014); Douglas 
Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 u. ill. l. rev. 839, 846 (2014) [hereinafter Laycock, 
Culture Wars].
31  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014).
32  The IRS defines a corporation as “closely held” if “1. It is not a personal service corporation” and “2. At 
any time during the last half of the tax year, more than 50% of the value of its outstanding stock is, directly 
or indirectly, owned by or for five or fewer individuals.” “Individual” includes certain trusts and private 
foundations. Corporations, I.R.S. Pub. No. 542, Cat. No. 15072O (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p542.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6PS-NDPL].
33  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
34  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
35  Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3, United States v. Warren, No. 4:18-cr-00223-RCC-BPV (D. Ariz. 
April 2, 2018).
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nal charges of violating the anti-harboring provision of Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA)36 for allegedly providing two undocumented migrants food, water, beds, and clean 
clothes at a private residence that serves as an aid station in the desert over an approximate 
three-day period.37 His trial is set for May 29, 2019.38 This Note’s suggestions for potential 
religious liberty claims should help prevent any further erosion of antidiscrimination law 
or reproductive rights in the name of religious liberty. Properly framed religious liberty 
claims could also re-insert the proper weighing of third-party burdens into the free exercise 
and the RFRA analysis.
I. Sanctuary and Religious Liberty: A Guided History
This part establishes the Constitutional framework for the freedom of religion found in 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Section I.A. traces 
the origins of the sanctuary movement in the immigration context. Section I.B. details the 
rise of religious liberty claims in the 1990s, focusing on RFRA as the crowning achieve-
ment of that movement. A close analysis of RFRA is provided, including its subsequent 
modifications, as many scholars and courts have disagreed over the rigor of its test and 
what behaviors it should cover. Section I.C focuses on the splintering of the RFRA coali-
tion that had come together to support it. 
It is true that many scholars consider the religious freedom jurisprudence in the United 
States “muddled” and “incoherent” and any solutions “patternless.”39 Indeed, the doctrine 
36  8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(a)(iii) (2012); see supra text accompanying note 9.
37  Criminal Complaint, United States v. Warren, No. 4:18-cr-00223-RCC-BPV (D. Ariz. Jan 18, 2018).
38  Status Conference, United States v. Warren, No. 4:18-cr-00223-RCC-DTF (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2019). 
Warren’s motion to dismiss based on RFRA was denied due to unresolved issues of fact. United States v. 
Warren, No. 4:18-cr-00223-RCC-BPV, 2018 WL 4403753, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2018). The court did 
not reach the merits of his RFRA defense. Id. at *5.
39  See Nelson Tebbe, How to Think About Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, 93 u. det. merCY l. 
rev. 353, 353–54 (2016) [hereinafter Tebbe, How to Think] (“Academic works about religious freedom in the 
United States often begin with a warning that the jurisprudence is in a state of crisis . . . . A group of skeptics 
has been arguing that a rational approach to religious freedom is necessarily impossible. They believe that 
the American discourse on free exercise and nonestablishment is broken and cannot be fixed. All we can 
do is muddle through, on this view, seeking patternless solutions to particular, ground-level disputes.”); see 
also steven d. smith, the rise and deCline oF ameriCan reliGious Freedom 10 (2014) (noting that the 
jurisprudence on religious freedom is widely seen to be “incoherent”); Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51 
san dieGo l. rev. 1037, 1043 (2014) (arguing that there is no satisfactorily rational way of dealing with 
cases concerning free exercise and nonestablishment).
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shifts as the composition of the Court changes, and sometimes those shifts produce seem-
ingly inconsistent results when looking to past precedent.40 This Note will aim to provide 
a brief introduction to the Constitutional framework to establish a baseline knowledge for 
the discussion of RFRA that follows. 
The First Amendment states in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”41 From this sen-
tence comes both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Under the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, the government may choose to lift regulatory burdens 
from religious actors, but not if providing those accommodations shifts burdens onto third 
parties—this type of shift would improperly impose the faith of one private party onto 
another, violating the government’s obligation to not favor one religion over another.42 Ad-
ditionally, believers of any religion cannot be favored over nonbelievers.43 The Court has 
affirmed this interpretation of the Establishment clause: “The First Amendment . . . gives 
no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their 
conduct to his own religious necessities.”44 
40  A comparison of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 
(1982) is illustrative. In Yoder, a Wisconsin state law requiring school attendance up until age sixteen was 
held to violate the Free Exercise Clause when challenged by members of the Amish religion. The families 
argued that their religion required their children to focus on uniquely Amish values and beliefs during their 
formative adolescent years. The Court held that the government’s interest in universal education was not 
compelling enough to override the free exercise rights. Lee dealt with the same religious interest—but came 
out the opposite way. In Lee, the court ruled against an Amish employer, with only Amish employees, who 
objected to both withholding social security taxes from his employees and paying the employer’s share of 
such taxes, claiming that both the payment and receipt of such benefits violated his Amish faith and thus 
violated his right to practice his religion under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court held that this limitation 
the social security system put on religious liberty was constitutional because of the overriding governmental 
interest in a sound tax system (it took some mental gymnastics to decide that social security taxes could not 
be distinguished from general taxes). “Wisconsin’s interest in requiring its children to attend school until they 
reach the age of 16 is surely not inferior to the federal interest in collecting these social security taxes.” Lee, 
445 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra Section II.A and its discussion of the problems 
with Hobby Lobby and Lee.
41  u.s. Const. amend. I.
42  Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 52.
43  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (“. . . a principle 
at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion 
to irreligion.”).
44  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (internal citations omitted).
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The Free Exercise Clause is also concerned with religious accommodations relieving 
government-imposed burdens on the exercise of religion by shifting those burdens onto 
others.45 Exercise includes belief and, since 1940, limited types of conduct.46 The Court 
has long held that government may accommodate religious practices without violating the 
Establishment Clause.47 Additionally, the Court has held that not all burdens on religion 
are unconstitutional.48 “There is room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free 
exercise requirements, without offense to the Establishment Clause.”49 
Religious accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause can be “mandatory” or “per-
missive.”50 Accommodation is mandatory when religion is singled out for special burdens 
not imposed on comparable secular conduct.51 These mandatory accommodations are re-
quired by the Constitution (under the Free Exercise Clause) and thus not subject to Es-
tablishment Clause scrutiny. These cases are rare, and the leading case is Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.52 
45  See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When followers of a particular sect enter 
into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that 
activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s 
religious faith on the employees.”).
46  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 
harv. l. rev. 1409, 1488–89 (1990). Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), marked the first time the 
Supreme Court included religiously motived conduct under the umbrella of the Free Exercise Clause, and, 
even then, only to a limited degree. Id. at 303–04 (“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom 
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”).
47  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144–145 (1987)).
48  Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
49  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
50  Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 327.
51  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
52  Id. at 523 (“The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice 
is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions.”). In Church of the Lukumi, a Florida 
city tried to prevent the Santeria religion from establishing a house of worship in the city by enacting 
ordinances specifically aimed at prohibiting religious animal sacrifice, which was central to the practice of 
the religion. Id. at 524–26. The statutes excluded kosher slaughter and all lawful secular animal killing from 
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Much more common are permissive accommodations. Given that these accommoda-
tions are, necessarily, optional, they are subject to the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause.53 A leading case is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor.54 In Caldor, a Connecticut state 
statute provided every Sabbath observer an absolute right to be excused from working on 
his or her Sabbath.55 The Court held this unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, 
noting that the statute favored some religions over others and Sabbath observers over those 
who do not observe. Significant burdens would be placed on the employees—the third 
parties—that had to work in place of Sabbath observers.56 
This religious freedom jurisprudence played a role in the original sanctuary movement 
and the later passage of RFRA.
A. The Birth of the Immigration Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s
The idea of sanctuary has origins that date back to both biblical times and ancient 
secular societies.57 The term “sanctuary” first appeared in the immigration context in the 
1980s, as churches and cities made efforts to provide various forms of assistance to asylum 
applicants from Central America.58 The sanctuary concept had different meanings in the 
public and private domains. Local governments made their cities sanctuary cities, for in-
stance, by passing measures indicating they would not inquire about a person’s citizenship 
its reach. Id. at 535–538. In a 9–0 decision, the Court held the ordinances unconstitutional under the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
53  Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 328; see also Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 u. pa. J. Const. l. 1, 11 (1998) (“Congress does not have a 
free hand to supplement [religious] liberty. The Establishment Clause provides a ceiling that does not permit 
the government significant room within which to expand religious liberties.”).
54  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
55  Id. at 704–06.
56  Id. at 708–09.
57  ann Crittenden, sanCtuarY 62 (1988) (noting the biblical roots of sanctuary); Jorge L. Carro, 
Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient 
Privilege?, 54 u. Cin. l. rev. 747, 761–67 (1986) (noting that the Greek, Roman, and Anglo-Saxon societies 
had concepts of sanctuaries). 
58  Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary, 61 s.m.u. l. rev. 133, 134–35 (2008). Immigrants from 
El Salvador and Guatemala were forced to leave their countries due to violence and civil war. Id. at 139. 
An estimated 500,000 to 750,000 Central Americans arrived in the United States between 1980 and 1983. 
Crittenden, supra note 57, at xvi; see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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status, and, in the private sector, churches provided sanctuary by offering asylum seekers 
from El Salvador and Guatemala food, clothing, and shelter as they resisted deportation.59 
This Note will focus on the private actor form of sanctuary. 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act, which allowed for the discretionary grant-
ing of asylum to refugees who met the requisite standard.60 Thousands of immigrants from 
El Salvador and Guatemala, countries in political, social, and civil turmoil, applied for 
political asylum in the United States.61 However, many of these claims were rejected on 
the basis that the fears of persecution were not specific enough to the individual applicant. 
For example, between June 1983 and September 1986, only 528 out of 19,207 applications 
from El Salvador were approved (2.6%).62 Critics of the large number of rejections argued 
that the United States was partly responsible for Central American asylum seekers’ situa-
tions on account of the United States government’s assistance and support to their military 
governments.63 In 1982, citing wrongful denial of Central American claims for asylum,64 a 
number of churches declared themselves “sanctuaries” in an effort to offer refuge to immi-
grants from El Salvador and Guatemala, and the sanctuary movement was born.65 
The churches felt a religious and moral obligation to assist the asylum seekers, who 
59  Villazor, supra note 58, at 137.
60  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (defining a refugee as “any person who is outside any country 
of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion . . . .”).
61  Villazor, supra note 58, at 139.
62  Crittenden, supra note 57, at 21–22. Many of the applications were rejected on the on the basis of 
citing to just a “generalized climate of terror” rather than the required showing of “specific threats” to a 
person’s life. 
63  Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury, A Government’s Weapon Against the 
Sanctuary Movement, 15 hoFstra l. rev. 5, 24–34 (1986) (reviewing reports issued by international bodies 
detailing the brutal killings and violence faced by civilians in El Salvador and Guatemala at the hands of their 
military governments and the different forms of support the United States provided to these governments). 
64  Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal 
Immigration Power, 74 u. Cin. l. rev. 1373, 1382 (2006) (explaining that the churches and other private 
groups formed the sanctuary movement because they believed that Guatemalans and Salvadorans were 
wrongly denied asylum to further American foreign policy objectives).
65  Villazor, supra note 58, at 140.
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were suffering because of the United States government, and drew parallels between the 
plight of the asylum seekers and that of Jews escaping Nazi Germany.66 In a declaration to 
the United States Attorney General, the leaders of the movement declared that the immi-
gration policy of denying the Central American asylum claims was “illegal and immoral.”67 
The leaders declared that, until the policy was changed, they would “not cease to extend the 
sanctuary of the church to undocumented people from Central America.”68
The movement offered a range of assistance to Central American immigrants, includ-
ing food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, as well as legal services through represen-
tation during deportation hearings.69 At its peak, “an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 church 
members70 and more than 100 churches and synagogues participated in the sanctuary 
movement.”71 
The morally grounded sanctuary contention ultimately led to legal clashes that were 
framed as conflicts between the church and state. In 1984 and 1985, the federal government 
prosecuted several individuals involved with the sanctuary network under section 274 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for violating the anti-harboring prohibition, 
as well as other provisions.72 Some defendants were convicted, while others were acquit-
ted.73 The case that drew the most attention involved the prosecution of eleven defendants, 
66  Id.; see also hilarY CunninGham, God and Caesar at the rio Grande: sanCtuarY and the politiCs 
oF reliGion 25 (1995) (explaining the view of those in the sanctuary movement on the parallels with Nazi 
persecution, which led participants in the sanctuary movement to feel that they could not “look the other 
way”).
67  See Crittenden, supra note 57, at 74.
68  Id.
69  iGnatius bau, this Ground is holY: ChurCh sanCtuarY and Central ameriCan reFuGees 12–13 
(1985).
70  Charles Austin, More Churches Join in Offering Sanctuary for Latin Refugees, n.Y. times (Sept. 21, 
1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/21/us/more-churches-join-in-offering-sanctuary-for-latin-refugees.
html [https://perma.cc/G8HV-WM7W]. 
71  Villazor, supra note 58, at 141; see also Colbert, supra note 63, at 44.
72  8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012); Villazor, supra note 58, at 141.
73  For example, Stacey Merkt, a sanctuary worker at Casa Oscar Romero, affiliated with the Catholic 
diocese in Brownsville, Tex., was convicted in a jury trial of conspiring to transport and move, and 
transporting and moving, two illegal aliens within the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), but her 
sentence was overturned on appeal for improper jury instructions, United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 
(5th Cir. 1985). The government declined to re-prosecute. However, Merkt was then arrested again and this 
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including the founders of the movement, in Tucson, Arizona.74 Eight of the eleven were 
convicted—two priests, one nun, and one minister among them75—of charges including 
conspiracy, harboring undocumented immigrants, and aiding and abetting unauthorized 
immigrants.76 One of their many defenses included the idea that the conduct of the sanctu-
ary workers was protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.77 The 
government, however, was granted a motion in limine to bar the defendants from raising 
this defense in court.78 Despite their convictions, the defendants received overwhelming 
support from the public, including forty-seven members of Congress, who argued for leni-
ency.79 Eventually, the convicted defendants had their sentences suspended.80 
The government—in stark contrast to how RFRA is applied and free exercise claims 
are evaluated by courts today81—refused to honor the defendants’ claims that their sanctu-
time was convicted of conspiracy. This was upheld on appeal. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 
1986). Jack Elder, the director of Casa Oscar Romero, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy, two counts 
of bringing in and landing illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), two counts of transporting 
illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), and served a five-month sentence in a San Antonio 
halfway house. Id. His successor, Lorry Thomas, was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. 
Wayne King, Church Sanctuary Worker Gets 2-year Term, n.Y. times (June 21, 1985), http://www.nytimes.
com/1985/06/21/us/church-sanctuary-worker-gets-2-year-term.html [https://perma.cc/G75W-HRTL]. 
74  CunninGham, supra note 66, at 55–59.
75  Hilary Cunningham, Sanctuary and Sovereignty: Church and State Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 40 J. 
ChurCh & st. 371, 372 (1998).
76  United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989); CunninGham, supra note 66, at 59.
77  Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal 
Immigration Law, 28 harv. C.r.-C.l. l. rev. 119, 139 (1993).
78  Colbert, supra note 63, at 62–63. The government did not challenge the legitimacy of the defendants’ 
firmly held religious beliefs but argued that the defense was not available as a matter of law. The government 
cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court established the rule that “only those interests of the highest 
order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). The 
government argued in its motion in limine that enforcement of the immigration law was an “interest of the 
highest order,” which could not be overridden by First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The 
court agreed and granted the motion, keeping the free exercise defense out of the trial. 
79  CunninGham, supra note 66, at 60.
80  Id. at 61.
81  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (courts are not to 
question where an individual “dr[aws] a line” in defining which practices run afoul of her religious beliefs).
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ary was religiously motivated.82 Instead, the government was insistent that the movement’s 
motivation was political, under the guise of religion: 
Government contempt for the sincerity of sanctuary workers’ religious 
motivations reached its apex when federal agents posing as co-workers 
and co-believers in the Arizona Sanctuary Movement made tape record-
ings and gathered information at church meetings and religious events. In 
court, the Government made every effort to suggest that what sanctuary 
workers called religious gatherings were in fact “press conferences” or 
“conspiratorial meetings.”83
Eventually, the sanctuary movement wound down with the enactment of amendments to 
the INA that made asylum seekers from El Salvador and Guatemala eligible for special 
refugee status.84 
It is important to note that ICE officers have the authority to “arrest any alien in the 
United States,”85 and there is not a geographic constraint on this power. After obtaining a 
warrant, the only thing preventing ICE from raiding religious spaces that have designated 
themselves as sanctuaries is, as mentioned previously, a policy directing ICE to avoid en-
forcement actions at sensitive locations like churches.86 This has led some religious lead-
ers, such as Cardinal Donald Wuerl of Washington, D.C., to caution their congregations 
from using the word sanctuary to avoid “holding out false hope” about the type of pro-
tection they can provide.87 Despite this concern, others maintain that, even in violation of 
82  Loken & Bambino, supra note 77, at 135.
83  Id.
84  Villazor, supra note 58, at 142 n.58. Additionally, in 1997, Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act (“NACAR”), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193–2201 (1997), 
which allowed some immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala to apply for cancellation of their removal. 
Id.
85  8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012). The statute nominally says the ICE officer must have “reason to believe that 
the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation,” but since entering the 
United States without inspection by immigration officers is a crime, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012), this does not 
erect a barrier to ICE arresting undocumented persons. 
86  See u.s. immiGration & Customs enF’t, supra note 12. 
87  Julie Zauzmer, Cardinal Wuerl voices Catholic support for immigrants but urges caution about 
sanctuary churches, wash. post (Mar. 2, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/
wp/2017/03/02/cardinal-wuerl-voices-catholic-support-for-immigrants-but-urges-caution-about-sanctuary-
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federal law, sanctuary works: “I can tell you from our own experience that all nine people 
who lived here have kept their families together, have been able to raise their children, have 
been able to go back to their jobs,” said Seth Kaper-Dale, pastor of the Reformed Church 
of Highland Park in New Jersey, which offered sanctuary to nine Indonesian immigrants in 
2012.88 After nearly a year of living in the church, ICE granted them stays of deportation.89 
And, more recently, sanctuary worked for Vizguerra, the Denver mother of four.
B. The Introduction of RFRA and its rise Through the 1990s and 2000s
It is hard to imagine a free exercise defense—asserted by a priest, nun, or minister, no 
less—being dismissed so readily today as it was in Aguilar in the 1980s. One year after the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions in Aguilar, the Supreme Court, too, tried to curb the 
reach of free exercise claims (in an opinion written by the famously conservative Justice 
Scalia).90 The decision in Employment Division v. Smith was roundly criticized and led to 
a bipartisan response widely praised at the time: the Religious Restoration Act of 1993. 
 1. Jurisprudence Prior to RFRA
It is worth understanding the religious liberty jurisprudence prior to the passage of 
RFRA. For many years, free exercise claims were governed by a balancing test derived 
from Sherbert v. Verner91 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.92 To determine whether challenged gov-
ernment actions violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Court weighed whether the chal-
lenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether 
it was needed to serve a compelling government interest.93 Inherent in this test was the 
idea that any religious accommodation for one group cannot burden any third-party group 
as this would improperly impose the faith of one private party onto another, violating the 
churches [https://perma.cc/U2LE-X9SY]. Wuerl went on: “With separation of church and state, the church 
really does not have the right to say, ‘You come in this building and the law doesn’t apply to you.’ But we do 
want to say we’ll be a voice for you.”
88  Rose, supra note 4.
89  Id.
90  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
91  374 U.S. 398 (1963).
92  406 U.S. 205 (1972).
93  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014).
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government’s obligation not to favor one religion over any other.94 
The actual level of scrutiny used in the “compelling interest” test in the religious lib-
erty context has long been a matter of debate. The test was originally developed outside 
of the religious exemption cases95—it emerged primarily in response to laws that inter-
fered with freedom of expression96 and disadvantaged racial minorities.97 In those con-
texts, only an extremely powerful government interest allows a government restriction to 
survive. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager note that the compelling interest test 
was first applied to the question of religious accommodation in Sherbert, which dealt with 
unemployment benefits.98 Some scholars maintain that the pre-Smith test employed strict 
scrutiny for free exercise claims.99 Others disagree.100 The Court itself has said that the 
pre-Smith jurisprudence did not use a strict scrutiny standard.101 Other than three additional 
94  Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 52–53.
95  Kent Greenawalt, Hobby Lobby, Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques and Standards, in the rise oF 
Corporate reliGious libertY 125, 132 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).
96  E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
97  E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
98  Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is 
Unconstitutional, 69 n.Y.u. l. rev. 437, 445 (1994). In Sherbert, the Court held that the South Carolina 
Unemployment Compensation Act violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying benefits to a woman who 
refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. The woman had been fired from her previous job 
for refusing to work on Saturdays, too. 
99  Jeremy Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 Colum. l. rev. 1915, 1995–96 
(2016); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. l. rev. 1453, 1465 (2015) (describing the 
Sherbert application of the compelling interest test as strict scrutiny).
100 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 132–33; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 445–48 (“Sherbert’s 
promise of the ruthless compelling state interest test proved remarkably toothless.”); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time 
and the RFRA: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 mont. l. rev. 171, 182–85, 
222–23 (1995) (arguing for a construction of RFRA that mimics the Court’s weaker application of the 
scrutiny test before Smith was decided).
101 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997) (“Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling 
interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most 
demanding test known to constitutional law . . . [RFRA] imposes in every case a least restrictive means 
requirement—a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify.”)
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unemployment benefits cases following Sherbert (“the Sherbert quartet”),102 and Yoder,103 
free exercise claims failed.104 This includes all free exercise cases, before and after Sher-
bert.105 Sometimes the Court even decided not to apply the compelling interest test to a free 
exercise claim. In Bowen v. Roy,106 the Court declined to apply the compelling interest test 
to a government regulation requiring welfare recipients have a social security number, as 
the Court reasoned the number was “purely a matter of internal government procedure and 
hence could not burden religious beliefs.”107 While Sherbert and Yoder came out in favor 
of those claiming a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, both cases emphasized that the 
exemptions did not burden any other person’s religious liberties.108 
Then, in 1990, the Court rejected the balancing test from Sherbert in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith.109 Smith curbed the free exercise protection provided by prior Court rulings 
by holding that no valid, constitutional free exercise claim can be made by those whose 
religious exercise is impaired by a generally applicable law not itself directed against re-
ligion.110 In other words, under Smith, judges no longer need to engage in a case-by-case 
assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws—the fact that 
the law was constitutional barred any free exercise challenge. The Court distinguished 
102 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
103 See supra text accompanying note 40 for a discussion of the facts and holding in Yoder.
104 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 445–46; see, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) 
(upholding a military rule against wearing headgear as applying even to an Orthodox Jewish psychologist at a 
mental health clinic); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying Free Exercise claim of 
religiously focused university that lost its tax exemption due to its engaging in a form of racial discrimination 
by prohibiting interracial dating); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (denying an exemption to 
an Amish employer objected to paying social security taxes on his employees, claiming that both the payment 
and receipt of such benefits violated his faith).
105 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 446.
106 476 U.S. 693, 700–01 (1986).
107 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 446 n.33.
108 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
109 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
110 Id. at 878–79, 881–82.
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Sherbert111 and rejected the free exercise claim of two members of the Native American 
Church whom had been fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization 
because they had ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a Church ceremony. They 
were further denied unemployment compensation because they had been discharged for 
work-related “misconduct,” violating an Oregon criminal statute that forbade the use of a 
“controlled substance.”112 The majority, written by Justice Scalia, upheld this denial since 
the Oregon criminal statute prohibiting drug use was constitutional and not specifically 
directed at their religious practice.113 This decision was wildly unpopular with academics, 
civil rights lawyers, and politicians.114 The critics of Smith organized to lobby Congress 
to pass a law protecting religion in the way the Court had refused.115 They were quickly 
successful. 
2. RFRA’s Passage, Celebrated by the Right, Left, and the New York Times
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 was introduced on March 11, 1993, 
by Representatives Charles Schumer, Democrat of New York, and Christopher C. Cox, 
Republican of California, in the House of Representatives, and a companion bill was in-
troduced on the same day in the Senate by Senators Ted Kennedy, Democrat of Massachu-
setts, and Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of Utah.116 The bill had wide bipartisan support, as 
it was adopted by a 97–3 vote in the Senate and by a House voice vote (which, in and of 
itself, indicates virtually no opposition).117 It was signed into law by President Bill Clinton, 
111 Even though both Sherbert and Smith involved unemployment compensation eligibility, the Court 
found a way to distinguish the two. Those that think the religious freedom jurisprudence is muddled might 
point to this as an example. The Sherbert quartet “involved employees being treated differently according 
to whether their reason was religious or non-religious, and employees whose religious practice was legal.” 
Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy, 9 harv. l. & pol’Y rev. 129, 134 (2015) [hereinafter 
Hamilton, Bad Public Policy]. Smith, in contrast, involved laws that applied equally to religious and non-
religious actors, and the religious practices themselves were illegal.” Id.
112 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874–75.
113 Id. at 890.
114 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 440.
115 Id.
116 Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, n.Y. times (Nov. 17, 1993), http://
www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.html [https://perma.cc/
H89C-3TZ8].
117 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 131.
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who proclaimed that RFRA affirmed, “the historic role that people of faith have played in 
the history of this country and the constitutional protections those who profess and express 
their faith have always demanded and cherished.”118 Vice President Al Gore added that 
RFRA, “is something that all Americans can support” and dubbed it “one of the most im-
portant steps to reaffirm religious freedom in my lifetime.”119 The New York Times piled on, 
writing, “[t]he Religious Freedom Restoration Act reasserts a broadly accepted American 
concept of giving wide latitude to religious practices that many might regard as odd or un-
conventional,” and hailing it as “a welcome antidote to the official insensitivity to religion 
the Court spawned in 1990.”120
With RFRA, Congress explicitly adopted what it considered the appropriate constitu-
tional standard.121 Congress reinstated the prior First Amendment law that preceded Smith, 
as the prior standard would have supported the free exercise claim in that case.122 To that 
point, RFRA provides that “government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,”123 which explicit-
ly rejects the holding of Smith. According to the Senate Report, RFRA’s purpose was “only 
to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.”124 The statute’s stated objective was to 
“restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.”125 According to RFRA, the compelling interest test, as established in prior federal 
court rulings, is “a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty 
and competing prior governmental interests.”126 As originally enacted, RFRA applied to 
any branch of federal or state government, to all officials, and to other persons acting under 
color of law.127 Its universal coverage included “all Federal and State law, and the imple-
118 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 438 (internal citations omitted).
119 Id.
120 Editorial, Congress Defends Religious Freedom, n.Y. times (Oct. 25, 1993), http://www.nytimes.
com/1993/10/25/opinion/congress-defends-religious-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/SRV5-33QV]. 
121 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 126.
122 Id. at 131.
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
124 s. rep. no. 103-111, 12 (1993).
125 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
126 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2012).
127 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 
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mentation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after 
[RFRA’s enactment].”128
Congress, and President Clinton, blindly signed off on a Pandora’s box of religious 
accommodations—nothing in the law points to particular believers, conduct, or potential 
harm.129 Smith had dealt with the Native American Church’s use of peyote. The legislative 
history for RFRA only contemplated a small number of exemptions for religious practices, 
such as exemptions for the Hmong people and Orthodox Jews from state laws that require 
autopsies in cases of suspicious death and for Orthodox Jews, who must walk to prayer, 
from land use laws that forbid the establishment of houses of worship in residential ar-
eas.130 No one involved in passing RFRA appeared to contemplate consequences for health 
care, for-profit corporations, LGBTQ rights in general, or immigration. This would prove 
regrettable.
3. The Subsequent Modification and Interpretation of RFRA 
In 1997, the Supreme Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores that RFRA was an uncon-
stitutional use of Congress’s Enforcement Clause powers under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment131 and therefore did not apply to the states generally. Congress, the Court held, had 
not shown a pattern of religious discrimination meriting such a far-reaching remedy and 
does not have the power to 1) enforce a constitutional right against the states by changing 
what that right is or 2) intrude into the states’ traditional prerogatives and general authority 
to regulate the health and welfare of their citizens.132 In response, Congress passed the Re-
ligious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) in part to correct 
the constitutional infirmities of RFRA,133 as the RLUIPA’s Section 7 amended RFRA by 
Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
128 Id.
129 Hamilton, Bad Public Policy, supra note 111, at 148.
130 See 139 ConG reC. H2356-03 (daily ed. May 11, 1993); 146 ConG. reC. E1564-01 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 
2000); Hamilton, Bad Public Policy, supra note 111, at 150, 155. 
131 The Fourteenth Amendment’s design “has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional 
separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary, depriving Congress of any power to interpret and 
elaborate on its meaning by conferring self-executing substantive rights against the States and thereby leaving 
the interpretive power with the Judiciary.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
132 Id. 
133 Daniel P. Dalton, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Recent Developments in 
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removing all references to the states from the statute.134 The Court implicitly affirmed these 
changes in 2006, as it applied RFRA to the federal government without questioning its con-
stitutionality.135 Additionally, after the Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the 
states, twenty-one states passed state versions of the federal RFRA law to restore pre-Smith 
scrutiny to their own laws that burden religious exercise.136 
RFRA states that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the Govern-
ment “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”137 Amended by the RLUIPA, RFRA covers “any exer-
cise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”138 
The RLUIPA further states that religious exercise should “be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chap-
ter and the Constitution.”139 RFRA kept the broad definition of government, providing that 
“the term ‘government’ includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official 
RLUIPA’s Land Use Jurisprudence, 44 urb. law. 647 (2012). 
134 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat 803 
(2000).
135 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
136 State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (May 4, 2017), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/8X68-5RM5]; see 
also Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment, ala. Const. Art. I, § 3.01; ariZ. rev. stat. ann. § 41-1493.01; 
Arkansas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ark. Code ann. § 16-123-401 (2015); Conn. Gen. stat. § 52-
571b; Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998, Fla. stat. § 761.01, et seq.; idaho Code § 73-402; Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ill. Comp. stat. ann. § 35/1, et seq.; [Indiana] Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, ind. Code ann. § 34-13-9 (2015); kan. stat. ann. § 60-5301, et seq.; kY. rev. stat. ann. § 446.350; 
Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, la. stat. ann. § 13:5231, et seq.; Mississippi Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act., miss. Code ann. § 11-61-1; mo. rev. stat. § 1.302; New Mexico Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, n.m. stat. ann. § 28-22-1, et seq.; okla. stat. tit. 51, § 251, et seq.; 71 pa. Cons. stat., 
§ 2403; Religious Freedom Restoration Act, r.i. Gen. laws § 42-80.1-1, et seq.; South Carolina Religious 
Freedom Act, s.C. Code ann. § 1-32-10, et seq.; Preservation of Religious Freedom, tenn. Code ann. § 4-1-
407; tex. Civ. praC. & rem Code § 110.001, et seq.; va. Code ann. § 57-2.02.
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(b) (2012).
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
139 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012).
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(or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity.”140 
The way it works is as follows. To invoke RFRA, a plaintiff must show that a govern-
mental action places a “substantial burden” on the plaintiff’s exercise of a sincerely held 
religious belief.141 If the plaintiff meets the “substantial burden” requirement, the burden 
shifts to the government to show a “compelling government interest” that is accomplished 
by the “least restrictive means.”142 RFRA’s power is still bound by the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses, as a statute cannot grant rights in conflict with the Constitution. Any 
court evaluating a RFRA claim must consider burdens shifted onto third parties.143 
As noted previously, the strictness of the compelling interest test prior to Smith—which 
is the standard RFRA explicitly adopts144—is a subject of great debate. Typically, “when 
people assert a constitutional right to an exemption from an otherwise valid statute, they 
seek special treatment not afforded to others. Courts generally have not insisted on an 
overpowering government interest to reject such claims; a genuine substantial interest suf-
fices.”145 The Sherbert and Yoder compelling interest test could properly be summed up as 
“strict in theory, feeble in fact.”146 The test necessarily had to work like this. Religious 
obligations can clash with the public interest in myriad ways. Enforcing manslaughter 
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (2012).
141 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
142 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
143 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014) (“It is certainly true that in applying 
RFRA ‘courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries.’”) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
144 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (“[RFRA] 
adopts a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith.”).
145 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 132.
146 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 447 (crediting the strict in theory, fatal in fact phrase to Gerald 
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 harv. l. rev. 1, 8 (1972)); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)) (“If ‘compelling interest’ 
really means what it says . . . many laws will not meet the test . . . . [The test] would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”).
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and child neglect laws,147 eliminating racial discrimination,148 adhering to minimum wage 
laws,149 and paying taxes150 are just a few examples. Religious beliefs don’t have to be 
“founded in reason, guided by reason, or governed in any way by the reasonable.”151 To let 
any religious liberty claim defeat all but the most compelling government interests would 
create an untenable situation—or, in other words, be “courting anarchy.”152
Since courts had not previously applied the most rigorous standard to religious claims 
prior to Smith, and since RFRA explicitly adopted the approach taken prior to Smith and 
refers to the prior test as “striking sensible balances,” the “compelling interest” standard in 
the RFRA context ought to be understood as a type of intermediate scrutiny,153 more than 
rational basis but less than the compelling interest test used against laws impacting racial 
discrimination or interfering with protected speech.154 Weighing third-party burdens—a 
fundamental part of the pre-Smith free exercise balancing test—factors into constituting 
a compelling government interest under RFRA’s balancing test.155 When passing RFRA, 
Congress expected courts considering RFRA claims to “look to free exercise cases decided 
prior to Smith for guidance.”156 They should follow that directive.
147 See, e.g., Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim.App. 1988) (upholding conviction of the 
parents of three-month-old infant who died from complications arising from pneumonia, as the parents, 
knowing he was sick, did not seek medical help and instead relied on prayer and divine intervention to heal 
him, as their faith instructed them to do).
148 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
149 Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (holding associates, mostly 
rehabilitated drug addicts, who received food, shelter, and clothing but no cash wages were employees for 
purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
151 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 447.
152 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
153 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 132–33.
154 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (protected speech); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (racial discrimination).
155 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 327.
156 s. rep. no. 103-111, 8 (1993).
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C. The Splintering of the RFRA Coalition 
  
For years, it was taken for granted that religion was “a good thing” deserving of ac-
commodation.157 Some point to the fight for gay rights and same-sex marriage as the cause 
of the weakening consensus on religious accommodation.158 By the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, the idea of religious accommodation, for some, had become code for 
discrimination.159 The coalition that gave RFRA near universal support in Congress—re-
ligious conservatives, religious liberals, and secular civil libertarians—broke apart by the 
late 1990s over the question whether civil rights in general, and gay rights in particular, 
are such compelling interests that they universally eclipse any claim of religious liberty 
without regard to the facts of individual cases.160 And in the early part of the twenty-first 
century, gay marriage saw its support grow with “extraordinary rapidity.”161 The 2003 Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision requiring the state to allow same-sex marriages 
sparked a fierce response from conservative religious organizations162 and then-President 
George W. Bush.163 This decision kicked off a campaign at the federal and state levels by 
the religious right against same-sex marriage, marking a point of no return for an alliance 
with those who valued equality over religiously motivated discrimination.
Early marriage equality statutes included accommodations for actors who opposed gay 
157 Horwitz, supra note 30, at 159 (quoting andrew koppelman, deFendinG ameriCan reliGious 
neutralitY 78 (2013)).
158 E.g., id. at 159–160.
159 Id. at 172.
160 Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 16, at 149.
161 Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 30, at 866 n.62 (citing a 2013 Washington Post-ABC poll that 
reported that fifty-eight percent of Americans say same-sex marriage should be legal, and thirty-six percent 
say it should be illegal, almost exactly reversing the results from the same question in 2003). Of course, the 
right for same-sex couples to marry was recognized by the Court in 2015 with the decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
162 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003); see, e.g., marCi a. hamilton, God vs. the 
Gavel 52 (2005) (quoting the American Family Association’s statement that “[t]his decision is on an order 
of magnitude that is beyond the capacity of words. The court has tampered with society’s DNA, and the 
consequent mutation will reap unimaginable consequences for Massachusetts and our nation.”).
163 hamilton, supra note 162, at 52 (“Marriage is a sacred institution between a man and a woman . . . . 
If activist judges insist on re-defining marriage by court order, the only alternative will be the constitutional 
process. We must do what is legally necessary to defend the sanctity of marriage.”) (internal citations 
omitted).
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marriages on religious grounds.164 Every single state that passed a marriage equality law, 
beginning with Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia in 
2009,165 prior to the Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,166 included exemptions for 
those with religious objections.167 While these were included in an effort to get the bills 
passed,168 the accommodations allowed for the erosion of civil rights principles.169 For ex-
ample, the accommodation provision that allowed religious actors to refuse to open their 
facilities for a same-sex wedding extended beyond just places of worship themselves into 
public accommodations owned by religious groups and nonprofits. Buildings routinely 
rented out to a wide selection of consumers can now be closed to gay couples wishing to 
hold a wedding reception.170 It was the marriage equality movement that saw the religious 
right begin to attempt to turn RFRA from a shield protecting free exercise into a sword for 
inflicting discrimination. 
II. From Shield to Sword: How the RFRA Claims Have Emerged to Threaten 
Reproductive Rights and LGBTQ Equality 
This part provides a close analysis of Hobby Lobby, the case that extended RFRA into 
164 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 25–26, 29. Those accommodations included 
solemnization provisions (clarifying clergy are not required to solemnize marriages to which they are 
religiously opposed), accommodations provisions (exempting religious organizations from providing goods, 
services, accommodations, or privileges for a wedding ceremony or reception), promotion of marriage 
provisions (clarifying that certain religiously-affiliated organizations need not involve themselves in the 
“promotion of marriages” to which they have theological objections), and adoption provisions (specifying 
that adoption agencies and other child placement organizations need not place children in ways that 
contravene their faith).
165 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Protections, 
64 Case w. res. l. rev. 1161, 1247 (2014).
166 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
167 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 25.
168 Wilson, supra note 165, at 1168–69 (arguing that religious accommodations had an important causal 
role in passage of marriage equality laws).
169 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 26.
170 Id.; see also Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 
339 Fed. Appx. 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2009) (summarizing facts of religious organization’s refusal to make 
the boardwalk it owned on the New Jersey Shore—which was open to the public and available to rent for 
wedding ceremonies—available for a civil union ceremony, and the resulting civil rights investigation by 
state agency).
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the secular marketplace to an unprecedented degree. Hobby Lobby should serve as a warn-
ing and example of the danger in asserting broad religious liberty claims, which should be 
avoided in the sanctuary context. The analysis shows how far of a reach RFRA can have 
if interpreted in the same way as the Hobby Lobby majority, and it also examines Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent to show an alternate interpretation of how RFRA should be applied. The 
majority, written by Justice Alito, provides a blueprint for those who want to use RFRA to 
discriminate, and it is vital that those who want to advocate for a narrower construction of 
RFRA in the sanctuary context understand the weaknesses of the majority’s argument. Part 
II.B then evaluates how this post-Hobby Lobby expanded understanding of religious lib-
erty is impacting antidiscrimination protection against LGBTQ persons in a case recently 
before the Court, Masterpiece Cakeshop.
A. Hobby Lobby and the Clash of Religious Liberty and Women’s Reproductive 
Health 
In 2014, the Court held in Hobby Lobby that closely held,171 for-profit corporations 
count as a “person” within the meaning of RFRA’s protection of a person’s exercise of reli-
gion.172 According to the Court, protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held, for-prof-
it corporations protect the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those com-
panies.173 This extension of RFRA came at the expense of women’s reproductive rights by 
striking down the contraception mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 (ACA),174 which required that employers provide health insurance that covered 
contraception without any cost sharing. At the time Hobby Lobby was decided, fifty-two 
percent of Americans were employed by closely held corporations.175
In Hobby Lobby, the two families that controlled the closely held, for-profit companies 
171 See supra text accompanying note 32 for a definition of “closely held.” 
172 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).
173 Id. at 2768.
174 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). The majority’s decision was premised on the fact that the female 
employees of these corporations would still have access to contraception: The insurance company would pay 
for it instead of their employers. However, just three days after the Hobby Lobby decision, the Court called 
this assumption into question with its decision in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).  
175 Aaron Blake, A LOT of People Could be Affected by the Supreme Court’s Birth Control Decision-
Theoretically, wash. post. (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/
wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affected-by-the-supreme-courts-birth-control-decision/ [https://
perma.cc/59DP-K4U8].
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at issue held religious convictions that human life begins once an egg is fertilized.176 To 
them, an emergency contraceptive pill taken after unprotected sex or the presence of an in-
trauterine device (IUD) that prevents the growth of such an egg by inhibiting its attachment 
to the uterus constitutes an abortion. 177 Based on this conviction that abortion constitutes 
wrongful death, the families sought an exemption for their companies from the require-
ment of regulations issued under the ACA178 to provide employee insurance that covers 
these four types of contraception methods that had been approved by the Federal Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). 
Hobby Lobby contained three main questions. First, did RFRA apply to closely held, 
for-profit corporations, even if the law from which the exemption is sought is designed 
to protect their workers, many of whom will not share the owners’ religious convictions? 
Second, is there a “substantial burden” on religious exercise? And, finally, does the govern-
ment either lack a compelling interest behind its regulation or fail to employ an available 
“less restrictive means” to achieve its objective? The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Alito, answered yes to all three. 
Justice Alito’s opinion pays virtually no attention to whether the new legal standard 
imposes third-party burdens by sacrificing female workers’ legitimate interests.179 It also 
ignores the serious administrative problems and the potential grant of concessions that 
go beyond what RFRA covers.180 In Justice Alito’s mind, the primary question is whether 
for-profit corporations count as “persons” within that statute, and he relies on both the legal 
fiction of corporations as persons and the Dictionary Act181 to get to yes. Because some 
176 In contrast, federal regulations define pregnancy as beginning at implementation, not conception. See, 
e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 8611 (1997); 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (2013).
177 Evidence indicates that one of the four objected to means of contraception, Plan B, may not operate by 
preventing a fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus. See Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other 
Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 b.C. l. rev. 1417, 1457–59 (2012).
178 Under the ACA, employers with fifty or more employees are required to provide “minimum essential 
coverage” in their health insurance plans. See 26 U.S.C. § 498oH(a), (c)(2) (2012). The Department of Health 
and Human services promulgated that minimum coverage includes “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration 
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.” 77 Fed. 
Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
179 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 130.
180 Id.
181 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)—though this act is only controlling where context does not indicate otherwise. Id.
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nonprofit corporations had been held to be “persons” under RFRA, Justice Alito wrote 
that, “no understanding of the term “person” includes some but not all corporations.”182 
In attempting to justify granting RFRA protection to for-profit corporations, Justice Alito 
relies partially on Braunfeld v. Brown,183 in which an Orthodox Jewish company sought an 
exemption from a Sunday closing law—but the company was not actually incorporated.184 
Justice Alito also states, erroneously, that “nothing in the text of the RFRA as originally en-
acted suggested that the statutory phrase ‘exercise of religion under the First Amendment’ 
was meant to be tied to this Court’s pre-Smith interpretation of that Amendment.”185
Once Justice Alito decided that RFRA did apply to closely held, for-profit corporations, 
he quickly found a substantial burden. In a change from past cases, Justice Alito assessed 
the burden based on the penalties for noncompliance ($100 per day for each employee, or 
$2,000 per employee per year for not providing insurance coverage at all), not in terms of 
its basic compliance requirements.186 To get to that point, Justice Alito had to assume that 
companies would accept a penalty rather than provide the insurance—and that willingness 
to suffer a penalty considerably helped establish the strength and intensity of their religious 
convictions.187 This illustrates the problem of administrability: How can courts assess how 
substantial the burden is on a particular person’s religious exercise? And if religious ex-
emptions are available and help a person avoid adverse consequences, a person wanting an 
exemption could persuade themselves and genuinely arrive at the belief that a law poses 
a substantial burden.188 Any group helping religious organizations or individuals advocate 
for exemptions in the name of sanctuary should avoid arguing for this interpretation of 
the substantial burden analysis. Instead, people or groups asserting religious exemptions 
182 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).
183 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
184 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 133.
185 This is just factually incorrect. As stated previously, the text of RFRA states its objective as to “restore 
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder.” See supra Part 
I.B.2. Additionally, the Senate report stated RFRA’s purpose was “only to overturn the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Smith.” See supra Part I.B.2.
186 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 137–38.
187 Id.
188 See id. at 139 n.57. The author points out that a similar situation arose during the Vietnam War, which 
many draftees perceived as unjustified. Some applied for conscientious objector exemptions, which require an 
objection to participating in “war in any form.” Many did actually arrive at this belief, although they would 
almost certainly not have in other circumstances, such as World War II.
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should rely on the proper pre-Smith test to determine the substantiality of a burden: wheth-
er a government action coerces a person to violate his or her religious beliefs or deny him 
or her the “rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”189 The fact that “the 
challenged Government action would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to 
pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs” does not automatically 
indicate the presence of a substantial burden.190
A tax case that Justice Alito distinguishes as a free exercise, but not a RFRA, issue—
even though RFRA restored the pre-Smith cases as the relevant evaluating standard—Unit-
ed States v. Lee is actually quite similar to the case at the bar. The Court declined to honor 
a free exercise claim by an Amish employer, with only Amish employees, who objected to 
paying social security taxes on his employees, claiming that both the payment and receipt 
of such benefits violated his Amish faith.191 His payment of taxes went toward his workers’ 
ability to receive those benefits, just as in Hobby Lobby the companies’ insurance payments 
went toward their employees’ ability to receive a benefit—and in Hobby Lobby, there were 
employees that did not share the corporations’ religious beliefs on contraception. There 
was no valid free exercise claim in Lee, but Justice Alito found one in Hobby Lobby.
In a “powerful dissent,”192 Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Court’s “decision 
elides entirely the distinction between the sincerity of a challenger’s religious belief and 
the substantiality of the burden placed on the challenger.”193 The substantiality of the bur-
den is a legal matter, a question of law, not any improper evaluation of the sincerity of a 
person’s religious belief. Here, Justice Ginsburg concludes that the requirement of offering 
insurance that covers contraception “is too attenuated to rank as substantial.”194 A company 
offering health insurance has no input on whether a woman will use any form of contracep-
tion, let alone one of the four types found objectionable in this case. That decision will be 
made by a woman and her doctor, and the insurance company pays for whatever medicinal 
product they chose. The company’s connection to the actual potential use of contraception, 
in Justice Ginsburg’s estimation, is too remote to constitute a substantial burden.  
189 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
190 Id.
191 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
192 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194 Id.
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Justice Alito pays short shrift to the compelling interest question, ultimately conclud-
ing that it is unnecessary to reach the issue.195 He assumes that the government’s interest 
in “guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods” meets the 
compelling interest standard, but not before dismissing broad interests like “public health” 
and “gender equality” and insisting that the government “demonstrate that the compelling 
interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the par-
ticular claimant.”196 Taking this language literally, though, is problematic.197 Take United 
States v. Lee: one employer failing to pay Social Security taxes would have virtually no 
impact on the overall system, but the government’s compelling interest would be gutted if 
it granted exceptions to all interested parties. And Lee is certainly part of the free exercise 
doctrine that RFRA explicitly restored as controlling law.198 
Justice Alito acknowledged that courts must consider third-party burdens when weigh-
ing the RFRA claims, but, instead of considering the impact of an exemption on female 
employees of Hobby Lobby, he immediately minimized the third-party burden analysis by 
flipping the issue and framing it in terms of benefits. “By framing any Government regula-
tion as benefiting a third party, the Government could turn all regulations into entitlements 
to which nobody could object on religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless.”199 The 
parade of horribles200 follows:
For example, the Government could decide that all supermarkets must sell 
alcohol for the convenience of customers (and thereby exclude Muslims 
with religious objections from owning supermarkets), or it could decide 
that all restaurants must remain open on Saturdays to give employees an 
195 Id. at 2780.
196 Id. at 2779–80.
197 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 141–42.
198 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). This is a particularly illustrative example of why some 
consider the Court’s religious liberty doctrine muddled and incoherent. 
199 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).
200 This parade of horribles tactic was a common feature of Justice Scalia’s opposition to gay rights. 
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, 
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity 
are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one 
of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its 
decision to exclude them from its holding.”).
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opportunity to earn tips (and thereby exclude Jews with religious objec-
tions from owning restaurants).201
Scholars have called this alleged analysis of third-party burdens “incoherent.”202
In Justice Alito’s world, the government could frame any law or regulation as an enti-
tlement, and the intended beneficiaries of those entitlements would then be burdened by its 
loss, thereby precluding a religious exemption under RFRA.203 This interpretation ignores 
the fact that any government interest must be a “compelling” one. In the end, the majority 
concluded the third-party burdens in Hobby Lobby were “precisely zero,” because the 
government could hypothetically create a new system in which it financed and provided 
contraceptives to women directly.204 Justice Alito paid no regard to the practicality of such 
a suggestion. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg described this hypothetical in another way: “the 
government, i.e., the general public, can pick up the tab.”205
The final question, centering on whether the denial of the exemption was the least 
restrictive means available, was resolved in the negative by Justice Alito. He decreed that 
the least restrictive means standard was “exceptionally demanding,”206 in contrast with 
the Court’s decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson.207 Cutter involved a successful RLUIPA chal-
lenge by men incarcerated in a federal prison in Ohio alleging that prison officials failed 
to accommodate their religious exercise.208 In Cutter, context mattered for the compelling 
interest/least restrictive means test, and “due deference” was given to prison officials on 
201 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37
202 Tebbe, How to Think, supra note 39, at 354; see also Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 331. 
(“[T]he role that the majority envisions for third-party burden analysis is insignificant and implausible”).
203 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 331.
204 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
205 Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 2780.
207 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
208 The petitioners assert that they were adherents of “nonmainstream” religions—the Satanist, Wicca, and 
Asatru religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian—and were not given the same opportunities for 
group worship that are granted to adherents of mainstream religions, among other claims. Id. at 712–13.
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maintaining order and safety209—far from an “exceptionally demanding” standard.210 Ulti-
mately in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito pointed to the fact that the Obama administration had 
already granted an exemption to nonprofit religious organizations from paying for insur-
ance for contraceptives if their use violated the organization’s religious beliefs as evidence 
that there was a lesser restrictive means available in Hobby Lobby.211 Justice Alito again 
went back to the idea of letting the public pick up the tab for the corporations, suggesting 
that the government could assume “the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue 
to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to 
their employers’ religious objections,” as the least restrictive means.212 Again, this raises 
the question of how to square Hobby Lobby with Lee—could the government not cover a 
small amount for social security should any of the Amish employees decide to accept the 
benefit in the future? 
209 Id. at 710.
210 The Court warned that allowing inmates exemptions would “jeopardize the effective functioning of an 
institution” and trigger a proper as-applied Establishment Clause challenge by prison authorities. Id. at 726. 
211 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781–82. If a nonprofit religious organization had group health insurance, 
the insurance company paid for the contraception used by insured employees, on the logic that this would 
not cost the insurance company additional money: paying for contraception was less expensive than paying 
for more costly medical treatment associated with unintended pregnancies and births. Or, if a religious 
nonprofit was self-insured, a third-party administrator provided contraception insurance from a company 
that administers Federal Facilitated Exchange Insurance. This “lesser restrictive means” satisfied the 
government’s compelling interest so long as organizations did not object to filling out the forms registering 
their objections—something contested almost immediately after the Hobby Lobby ruling. See Wheaton 
College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (holding that to obtain injunction pending appeal, the college was 
not required to follow notice procedures for a nonprofit organization’s claim for religious accommodation, 
to which procedures the college objected on religious grounds). In 2015, the Seventh Circuit in Wheaton 
College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2015) (Wheaton College II) affirmed the denial of another 
preliminary injunction for Wheaton College, holding that the college was “incorrect” in its belief that, as the 
trigger-puller or facilitator, it shared responsibility for the extension of emergency contraception coverage to 
its students, faculty, and staff. Id. at 796; see also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of Notre 
Dame v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). In 2016, the eight-member Court avoided ruling on the merits and 
vacated denials of injunctive relief and remanded cases back to the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits for 
supplemental briefing. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561. The parties and the government were encouraged to find an 
acceptable compromise on the notice issue but never did and never needed to after the Trump administration 
promulgated new regulations that rolled back the contraception mandate. Religious Exemptions and 
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 47792 (Oct. 13, 2017), 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2017), 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (2017). Employers no longer 
have to file any paperwork with the government to stop offering birth control—they just have to notify their 
employees. 
212 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
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Ultimately, Justice Alito stripped the analysis in Hobby Lobby of any context, acting 
like each legal question—the meaning of “a person’s exercise of religion,” the substanti-
ality of a burden, the compelling interest test and the least restrictive means analysis— is 
distinct and not interconnected to any other question.213 He attempted to present a complex 
question as simple when it was anything but that. By protecting the religious liberties of 
corporations, the Hobby Lobby decision awakens echoes of an ideal of private ordering 
from the Lochner era.214 In this world view, the refusal to serve certain individuals, such as 
women in need of emergency contraception or LGBTQ individuals, is merely declining to 
enter into a private contract, and government regulation unfairly imposes on businesses, 
endorsing a line of thinking that prioritizes “the general right of an individual to be free 
in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.” 215 It is not hard to 
see how this Lochner-esque thinking could undermine antidiscrimination laws protecting 
LGBTQ communities if the compelling interest test is applied in a “strict in theory, fatal in 
fact” manner, unlike the pre-Smith “strict in theory, feeble in fact” way.216 Those asserting 
religious liberty claims in the name of sanctuary should take care not to further usher in a 
return to the Lochner era. 
In dissent, Justice Ginsberg charged the court with wrongly treating RFRA “as a bold 
initiative departing from, rather than restoring, pre-Smith jurisprudence,”217 pointing out 
that Congress had “enacted RFRA to serve a far less radical purpose” than that.218 The 
majority, in Justice Ginsburg’s estimation, was too accepting of religious accommodations 
from general laws and too willing to let the public—especially women—bear the costs of 
those accommodations.219 By its unprecedented extending of RFRA into the commercial 
sphere, the Court took steps to eliminate the long-respected inalienable boundary between 
church and state. 
The Court did allow that other insurance-coverage mandates would not automatically 
213 Greenawalt, supra note 95, at 146.
214 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (recognizing a freedom of contract); Sepper, supra note 
99, at 1456.
215 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58; Sepper, supra note 99, at 1457.
216 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98, at 447.
217 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791–92 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219 Id.
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fail the RFRA balancing test if they conflicted with an employer’s religious beliefs.220 In-
deed, the Third Circuit found a way to hold that the contraceptive mandate is not a substan-
tial burden to the free exercise of religion, 221 and it did this by actually analyzing the how 
substantial the burden was to religious exercise—unlike Hobby Lobby, which assessed the 
burden based on potential penalties for noncompliance. Anyone asserting a RFRA claim in 
any context, including sanctuary, should push for both an actual substantial burden analysis 
and an evaluation of the burdens placed on third parties. 
Finally, the Hobby Lobby Court recognized that antidiscrimination laws come with 
a compelling government interest in providing equal opportunities.222 This could provide 
an avenue for the return to the pre-Smith compelling interest test and provide protection 
against religious liberty claims that attempt to discriminate against LGBTQ persons. 
B. The Next Supreme Court Battle: Religious Liberty and LGBTQ Equality
While Hobby Lobby was a case involving the contraception mandate and women’s 
reproductive rights more broadly, there were immediate concerns about its spillover effects 
on LGTBQ rights. Justice Ginsburg alluded to consequences for the LGBTQ community 
220 Id. at 2783 (“Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different 
interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different 
arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.”).
221 Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017). A 
nonprofit, non-religious, anti-abortion organization and its employees challenged the contraception mandate 
as a burden to their free exercise, among other claims. The Third Circuit considered two questions, and, “after 
careful review, but without any hesitation,” answered both in the negative. Id. at 343. The first: Whether 
the contraceptive mandate must exempt a secular anti-abortion group with no religious affiliation. And 
the second: Whether an employee’s religious beliefs are substantially burdened by the law’s requirement 
that his or her employer’s insurance plan cover contraceptives. The Third Circuit distinguished Hobby 
Lobby by saying it held “that an employer’s provision, not an individual’s maintenance, of coverage may 
violate RFRA.” Id. at 355 n.17. Further, the Third Circuit considered the question of whether a burden was 
substantial enough to trigger RFRA a question of law. The Third Circuit cited Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n for the proposition that there is no substantial burden if the governmental 
action does not coerce the individuals to violate their religious beliefs or deny them the “rights, benefits, 
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens”—even if “the challenged Government action would interfere 
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious 
beliefs.” 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988). Finally, the Third Circuit held that the employees had “failed to 
demonstrate that the Contraceptive Mandate forces them to violate their religious beliefs.” Id. at 356–59.
222 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (“The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination 
are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”).
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in her dissent: “Hobby Lobby and Conestoga surely do not stand alone as commercial en-
terprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of their religious 
beliefs,” she wrote, before citing to two cases in which claims for religious accommo-
dations had been invoked against LBGTQ people.223 “Would RFRA require exemptions 
in cases of this ilk? And if not, how does the Court divine which religious beliefs are 
worthy of accommodation, and which are not?”224 News commentators and others had al-
ready explicitly made the connection between the forthcoming ruling in Hobby Lobby and 
the potential segue to LGBTQ discrimination in the name of religious accommodation.225 
And, one year later in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts foreshadowed the battles to come 
(“Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to 
conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage . . . . There is little doubt that these and 
similar questions will soon be before this Court.”).226
It was not a surprise, then, to see Hobby Lobby cited—incorrectly as it was—in the 
brief for the petitioners in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,227 
decided by the Court this past term.228 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a gay couple walked into 
a retail bakery in 2012—a place of public accommodation—hoping to buy a wedding cake. 
They were denied service on the basis of their sexual orientation, in violation of the Colo-
rado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).229
223 Id. at 2804–05, with citations to Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) 
(for-profit photography business owned by a heterosexual couple refused to photograph a lesbian couple’s 
commitment ceremony based on the religious beliefs of the business owners) and In re Minnesota ex rel. 
McClure, 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1985) (born-again Christians who owned closely held, for-profit 
health clubs believed that the Bible proscribed hiring or retaining any person “antagonistic to the Bible,” 
including “fornicators and homosexuals”).
224 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225 See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Upsets Church-State Balance and 
Enhances Digital Privacy in Key End-of Term Decisions (July 1, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/news/supreme-
court-upsets-church-state-balance-and-enhances-digital-privacy-key-end-term-decisions [https://perma.cc/
Z9E6-NZLQ]; Adam Winkler, Will the Supreme Court License Anti-Gay Discrimination?, huFFinGton post 
(Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/will-the-supreme-court-li_b_5020848.html 
[https://perma.cc/5LWU-G8SX].
226 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625–26 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
227 Brief for Petitioner at 38, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter, Petitioner’s Brief].
228 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
229 Colo. rev. stat. §§ 24-34-301–601. 
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The petitioner cites to Hobby Lobby for free exercise protection for his closely held, 
for-profit business (Hobby Lobby was explicitly not decided on free exercise grounds).230 
In regard to the free exercise argument, the weighing of third-party burdens as part of a bal-
anced approach “is all the more in order when the Free Exercise Clause itself is at stake, not 
a statute designed to promote accommodation to religious beliefs and practices.”231 This is 
not a RFRA case—because RFRA was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states—and 
Colorado has not passed a state RFRA statute.232 Colorado courts have affirmed that the 
state follows the Smith standard for free exercise claims: for state action, neutral laws of 
general applicability “need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest 
in order to survive a constitutional challenge.”233 
Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, considers himself an “active partici-
pant” in the “sacred event” of marriage by virtue of providing a cake for a celebration after 
the ceremony has concluded.234 In this situation, the couple planned to marry in Massachu-
setts before returning home to Colorado to have the cake and celebrate with friends.235 The 
baker’s connection to the marriage is attenuated at best.
When the Court’s much-anticipated opinion was released, it featured a narrow ruling, 
saving the difficult decisions on the merits for another day and vacating the ruling of the 
Colorado Court of Appeals on the basis that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission treated 
Phillips’ case with “clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs 
that motivated his objection,” thus violating the Free Exercise Clause.236 Writing for the 
7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy cited Church of the Lukumi for the proposition that “the 
230 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014) (distinguishing Lee as not controlling because 
“Lee was a free-exercise, not a RFRA, case”); id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court does not 
pretend that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause demands religion-based accommodations so 
extreme, for our decisions leave no doubt on that score.”).
231 Id. at 2790 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
232 J. Ryann Peyton et. al, CADA: The Intersection of LGBT Civil Rights and Religious Freedom, Colo. 
law. Jan. 2017, at 31, 36 (citing two failed attempts in 2015 and 2016 to pass a state RFRA law).
233 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 289 (Colo. App. 2015) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 883 (1990)); Peyton, supra note 232, at 35.
234 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 227, at 38.
235 Brief for Respondent at 10–11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 
2290 (2017) (No. 16-111).
236 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Com’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018).
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government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose 
regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a 
manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and 
practices.”237 The majority’s basis for finding hostility on the part of the Commission stems 
in part from uncontested comments made during a public meeting by one commissioner:
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of dis-
crimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the [H]
olocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations 
where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to 
me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use 
to—to use their religion to hurt others.238
The majority held “[t]his sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the 
solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination 
law—a law that protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual 
orientation.”239 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg distinguished Church of the Lukumi as a case 
in which the government action that violated a principle of religious neutrality implicat-
ed a sole decision-making body—the city council—versus Masterpiece Cakeshop, which 
involved several layers of independent decision making, with the Commission making up 
just one of those layers: 
First, the [Colorado Civil Rights] Division had to find probable cause 
that Phillips violated CADA. Second, the ALJ [administrative law judge] 
entertained the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Third, the 
Commission heard Phillips’ appeal. Fourth, after the Commission’s ruling, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals considered the case de novo. What preju-
dice infected the determinations of the adjudicators in the case before and 
after the Commission? The Court does not say.240
The dissent, which was joined by Justice Sotomayor, also was not persuaded by the 
majority’s other basis for its ruling of unconstitutional religious hostility. The fact that the 
237 Id. at 1731.
238 Id. at 1729.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 1751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Colorado Civil Rights Division and the Commission had found that three bakers acted law-
fully when they refused to design cakes with religious text and anti-gay messages express-
ing disapproval of same-sex marriages for a customer, unlike the finding in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop of an unlawful refusal.241 The majority pointed to a footnote in the decision be-
low and claimed the basis for the difference in treatment in these cases was, impermissibly, 
the Colorado court’s own assessment of offensiveness.242 
[I]t is not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its 
officials to prescribe what shall be offensive . . . . The Colorado court’s at-
tempt to account for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what 
is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official disapproval of 
Phillips’ religious beliefs.243 
The dissent makes the distinction the majority refuses to recognize: “The bakers would 
have refused to make a cake with [William] Jack’s requested message for any customer, 
regardless of his or her religion . . . . Phillips would not sell to Craig and Mullins, for no 
reason other than their sexual orientation, a cake of the kind he regularly sold to others.”244 
The dissent would have affirmed the decision below, finding Phillips in violation of Colo-
rado’s antidiscrimination law.245 
The majority did reiterate the fact that “[t]he Court’s precedents make clear that the 
baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right 
to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws.”246 At least one lower 
court immediately took this to heart, citing Masterpiece Cakeshop two days after it was 
decided in an opinion affirming summary judgment for the city of Phoenix against a claim 
that its ordinance prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation on the 
basis of sexual orientation violated the plaintiffs’ rights to free speech and free exercise of 
religion.247 Another case before the Court that presented the same free exercise questions, 
241 Id. at 1730.
242 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 1752 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 1723–24.
247 Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
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Arlene’s Flowers Inc. v. Washington, had its judgment below vacated and remanded back to 
the Supreme Court of Washington for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cake-
shop.248 In affirming judgment for the state, the Supreme Court of Washington had cited 
Smith and used rational basis review to reject the free exercise challenge to the neutral, 
generally applicable Washington law against discrimination (WLAD).249 The majority in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop did not express an opinion on Smith. Justice Gorsuch, concurring 
in the judgment, noted that “Smith remains controversial in many quarters.”250 While the 
Court declined to rule on the merits in Masterpiece Cakeshop and Arlene’s Flowers, the 
open question about where to draw the line between religious liberty and antidiscrimina-
tion is not going away. 
One important difference between Masterpiece Cakeshop and the next case presenting 
the antidiscrimination-free exercise decision will be the difference in the composition of 
the Court itself. The retirement of Justice Kennedy, who was the deciding vote in the land-
mark gay rights cases United States v. Windsor251 and Obergefell v. Hodges,252 combined 
with the confirmation of Justice Kavanaugh, gives the Court a conservative majority that 
will likely be more sympathetic to religious liberty claims made by Christians. Justice 
Kavanaugh’s prior opinions suggest that he will be sympathetic to these claims.253 For this 
248 Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
249 State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017).
250 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring).
251 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
252 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
253 Then-Judge Kavanaugh argued, in dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc, that the mere act of 
having religious nonprofits fill out a form registering their religious objections to fulfilling the contraception 
mandate constituted a substantial burden on the company’s beliefs in violation of RFRA. Priests for Life v. 
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 808 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (“the regulations substantially burden the religious organizations’ exercise 
of religion because the regulations require the organizations to take an action contrary to their sincere 
religious beliefs (submitting the form) or else pay significant monetary penalties”). Additionally, in a 2010 
Establishment Clause case, Kavanaugh wrote separately to concur in the judgment upholding the dismissal 
of a complaint filed by several atheists opposing prayers and the addition of the term “so help me God” to 
the presidential oath at the presidential inauguration ceremony in 2008. Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). The complaint was dismissed as moot as to the 2008 inauguration, and the court held that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge future inaugurations. Kavanaugh disagreed with the majority that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing, so he wrote separately to address the merits. He chose to apply the “tradition” 
test from Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), which essentially grants a free pass to all longstanding 
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reason, it is worth considering one argument advanced by the petitioners in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop that was not addressed by the majority. The petitioners in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
challenged the general applicability of the antidiscrimination law in their brief by arguing 
that Phillips, who opposes same-sex marriage, is punished while bakers who approve of 
same-sex marriage are protected.254 It is this Note’s position that if this is the standard for 
evaluating the general applicability of laws, every antidiscrimination law would be held to 
violate the Free Exercise Clause. For example, laws protecting against racial discrimina-
tion “punish” white supremacists and “protect” those who believe in equality. The petition-
er uses a zero-sum game to pit the LGBTQ community against people of faith, claiming 
that protection for the former is taking rights away from the latter.255 This has never been 
the framework for evaluating antidiscrimination, free exercise, or RFRA claims. The idea 
that public accommodations laws interfere with a business owner’s free exercise of religion 
has been rejected as “patently frivolous.”256 And the Court has held that a nondiscrimina-
tion policy protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a law of 
general applicability that does not target or single out religious beliefs and is therefore valid 
under the Free Exercise Clause.257
In the inevitable next challenge before the Court, the proper baseline for measuring 
third-party burdens in free exercise and RFRA claims should be the distribution of burdens 
and benefits existing immediately preceding the proposed accommodation, not some fan-
tasy world in which there are no government protections in place. Where the government 
has provided for antidiscrimination laws, for instance, eroding them in the name of one 
religion constitutes a burden that violates both Religions Clauses and RFRA. As Justice 
Scalia reasoned in another free exercise case:
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit 
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are mea-
sured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some individuals 
religious speech that is nonproselytizing. “However, there is significant debate about whether Marsh applies 
in contexts outside of those in which government religious speech goes back to the time of the framing.” 
Frank Ravitch, Judge Kavanaugh on law and religion issues, sCotusbloG (July 30, 2018), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2018/07/judge-kavanaugh-on-law-and-religion-issues/ [https://perma.cc/M58J-MJSJ].
254 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 227, at 38–39.
255 Id. at 41 (“the Commission’s one-sided construction of CADA affords broader protection to LGBT 
consumers than to people of faith.”).
256 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968).
257 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669, 697 n.27 (2010).
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solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less 
than if it had imposed a special tax.258 
Antidiscrimination laws—and the right to marry for same-sex couples—are part of the 
baseline against which any proposed accommodation for religion are measured. There 
would be heavy third-party burdens to bear should any of those protections be weakened 
in the name of religion. 
There is no right to religious accommodation at the expense of antidiscrimination,259 
especially under the Smith standard of no religious exemptions from generally applicable 
laws. It is, of course, possible that the future Court will have a different view than the one 
suggested in this Note and find a way to muddle the religious liberty doctrine even further. 
If that is the case, it will be a dark day for those who view antidiscrimination principles as 
absolute and vital to the functioning of our country. 
III. Suggestions for Potential Religious Liberty Claims in the Name of Sanctuary
This section offers suggestions for any potential religious liberty claims that would 
arise in a sanctuary context. They should, in short, turn RFRA back into a shield, as opposed 
to wielding it as a sword. It seems most likely that RFRA would be raised by religious of-
ficials in a defense to criminal charges of harboring under section 274 of the INA.260 Given 
that immigration is seen as a domain for federal law exclusively,261 RFRA would be the rel-
evant statute for any religious liberty challenge to immigration law. Indeed, this is exactly 
what happened in the case of Scott Daniel Warren, the Arizona No More Deaths volunteer 
accused of providing two undocumented migrants with food, water, beds, and clean clothes 
at “the barn,” a small, private residence in Ajo, Arizona, that humanitarian groups use as an 
operations base to help migrants crossing into the United States through the desert.262 His 
258 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726–27 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that the government’s interest 
in eradicating racial discrimination overcomes “whatever burden” might be placed on religiously motivated 
conduct).
260 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012); see supra text accompanying note 9.
261 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2010) (“The Government of the United States has 
broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens . . . . It is fundamental that 
foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must 
be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”).
262 Ryan Lucas, Deep In The Desert, A Case Pits Immigration Crackdown Against Religious Freedom, 
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trial, which is set for Jan. 8, 2019,263 could provide a model for sanctuary advocates looking 
to advance RFRA defenses—or ammunition for the government to defeat RFRA claims in 
the name of sanctuary.
In this limited context of sanctuary, the RFRA standard is fortunate, because Smith 
would quickly shut down any religious exemption challenge to the generally applicable 
immigration laws.264 There would necessarily be a fight between prosecution and defense 
over how to define the government’s compelling interest. The government would likely 
advocate for a broadly defined interest, like border protection.265 However, for the har-
boring cases that do not involve charges of transporting immigrants across the border,266 
defendants should advocate for a more narrowly defined government interest, such as a 
government interest in raiding places of worship. Additionally, defendants could challenge 
raiding places of worship as the “least restrictive means” available to achieve the compel-
ling government interest. 
These potential religious liberty claims in the name of sanctuary should be narrowly 
tailored and not overbroad to the point where they could also be argued against reproduc-
tive and women’s health rights and LGBTQ equality. Admittedly, this is challenging, like 
threading a needle. For example, it would not be wise to attempt to ground any sanctuary 
religious liberty claims in the text of the Bible, even when it would be helpful.267 The Bible 
is a double-edged sword, as Attorney General Jeff Sessions cited to it in defense of the 
NPR (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/18/658255488/deep-in-the-desert-a-case-pits-
immigration-crackdown-against-religious-freedom [https://perma.cc/9TBR-7BLS].
263 Order Continuing Plea Deadline and Trial, United States v. Warren, No. CR-18-00223-001-TUC-RCC 
(BPV) (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 2018).
264 The INA explicitly prohibits certain discriminatory decision-making practices. See, e.g., INA § 202(a)
(1), 8 U.S.C. § S152(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in visa issuance due to a person’s race, sex, 
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence).
265 It may be useful in this instance to cite to Hobby Lobby and the majority’s insistence that broad 
interests (in that case “public health” and “gender equality”) were out of sync with RFRA’s requirement of a 
“more focused” inquiry, which demanded that the Government demonstrate that the compelling interest test is 
satisfied through application of the challenged law to the particular claimant. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. 2751, 2779–80 (2014). Of course, that can’t possibly be true under Lee, which is part of the pre-Smith line 
of cases RFRA restored.
266 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
267 See, e.g., Matthew 25:35 (“For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you 
gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in”).
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administration’s policy of separating children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der.268 Opponents of gay rights also frequently quote Bible passages as the source of their 
convictions.269 If those who value reproductive rights, LGBTQ equality, and protection for 
immigrants seek to legitimize the Bible as the basis for a RFRA claim, conservative Chris-
tians will do the same, to the determinant of all those interests. 
Additionally, attempting to have the government interest drawn too narrowly—such 
as a government interest in prosecuting individual sanctuary workers—should be avoided 
as well. This could allow individual businesses like Masterpiece Cakeshop to argue for 
exemptions to existing antidiscrimination laws. No antidiscrimination laws face obvious 
potential erosion if the government honors the sincerely held religious beliefs of congre-
gation leaders like First Unitarian Society’s Reverend Mike Morran, who helped Jeanette 
Vizguerra avoid deportation in Colorado, and does not prosecute him or raid his church. 
And no third parties are burdened by this accommodation. It is current ICE policy not to 
raid churches, so no one will be burdened if the policy continues to exist. 
Any religious liberty claims for sanctuary should be analogized to existing protections 
in antidiscrimination law, not “conscience clauses.” Religious organizations should also 
advocate for courts to take a critical, hard look at RFRA claims, using a more searching 
review, in an attempt to keep them narrowly constructed to the immigration sanctuary 
realm. And courts should not be afraid to weigh the sincerity of a person’s sincerely held 
religious belief—an activity the Court has engaged in for decades with religion in a variety 
of contexts. 
A. Draw Analogies not to “Conscience,” but Antidiscrimination 
One temptation that should be avoided is any analogizing of religious liberty sanctuary 
claims to “conscience clauses,” or “refusal clauses,” which protect opponents of abortion 
268 Richard Gonzalezs, Sessions Cites The Bible To Justify Immigrant Family Separations, npr (June 
14, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/14/620181177/sessions-cites-the-bible-to-justify-immigrant-family-
separations [https://perma.cc/G95N-5G84] (“I would cite you to the Apostle Paul and his clear and wise 
command in Romans 13, to obey the laws of the government because God has ordained them for the purpose 
of order,” Sessions said during a speech to law enforcement officers in Fort Wayne, Ind. “Orderly and lawful 
processes are good in themselves and protect the weak and lawful,” Sessions said, prefacing his remarks by 
saying he was addressing the concerns “of our church friends”).
269 See, e.g., Matthew 19:4–5, (“Jesus answered, ‘Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator 
‘made them male and female’ and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united 
to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’?”); Romans 1:24–32.
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from direct involvement in terminating a pregnancy.270 These “conscience clauses” ex-
tend significant protection for objections based on conscience generally, not just religious 
beliefs. It is not hard to imagine sanctuary-based religious liberty claims analogous to 
conscience clauses getting exploited in settings involving reproductive rights and LGBTQ 
rights.271 Letting a for-profit corporation or place of public accommodation refuse service 
based on conscience is akin to a license to discriminate. 
Conscience clauses “usually apply regardless of whether accommodating objectors 
imposes serious burdens on patients seeking a medical good or service.”272 The Hyde-Wel-
don Amendment does not even provide an exception for emergency situations.273 By not 
basing protection on religion, conscience clauses use a broad scope that avoids potential 
Establishment Clause issues for exempting religious people but then shifting the cost of 
that relief onto women who do not share those religious beliefs.274 Of course, this does not 
eliminate the impact on the affected third parties—in fact, it does the opposite.
 
Conscience clauses apply at a discrete, singular moment in time: the time of a re-
quested medical procedure.275 In contrast, sanctuary-based religious liberty claims extend 
much further in time. Expanding conscience clauses beyond the abortion arena could facil-
itate unintended further expansion in the reproductive rights field and against the LGBTQ 
community. Prior to Obergefell, some scholars advocated that religious groups assert con-
science clause-based arguments against gay marriage.276 Had that idea gathered steam and 
270 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 42. The 1973 Church Amendment prohibits federal 
programs from conditioning funding on any requirement that a person “perform or assist in the performance 
of any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the performance of such 
procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.” 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7. 
The 2005 Hyde-Weldon Amendment extended the degree of performance to cover “facilitat[ing] in any way” 
the performance of an abortion and expanded the meaning of procedure to include “counseling and referral.” 
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B).
271 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2789 n.6 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Separating 
moral convictions from religious beliefs would be of questionable legitimacy”) (internal citation omitted).
272 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 43.
273 Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004).
274 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 44.
275 Id. at 45.
276 See, e.g., Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 30, at 839; Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage 
and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 nw. J. l. & soC. pol’Y 206 (2010); Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Same Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After Prop 8, 14 Nexus 101, 109–10 (2009).
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those who supported marriage equality been willing to compromise, situations like that in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop would be widespread. 
A better solution would be to think about whether a religious exemption would be 
provided in the domain of antidiscrimination law generally, or in a particular law that pro-
tects against discrimination based on race or gender.277 Unlike in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
no religious liberty argument in the name of sanctuary should aim to curtail the reach 
of antidiscrimination law. The standard for judging third-party burdens should be one of 
“materiality,” or “de minimis,” similar to the “undue hardship”278 standard under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.279 Under Title VII, employees have the right to “reason-
able accommodations”—defined as ones that do not impose “undue hardship” on the em-
ployer280—of their religious beliefs and practices.281 Granting a religious liberty claim to 
a church official offering sanctuary to an undocumented immigrant does not impose any 
undue hardship on any third party—unlike Masterpiece Cakeshop, where the burden borne 
on the LGBTQ third parties is their loss of dignity and standing as equals under the law. 
One of the basic purposes of antidiscrimination law is to preserve the equal standing of 
members of minority groups in the economy and in society.282 It is not just the government 
that can infringe on equal standing, but exclusion from nongovernmental entities that is 
277 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 29.
278 An “undue hardship” is any burden on the employer exceeding an insignificant or “de minimis” cost. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 32 U.S. 63, 85 (1977). In Hardison, an employee claimed a right 
under Title VII not to work on his Saturday Sabbath, and the Court found that the employer, TWA, could 
only have accommodated this at the expense of others by denying more senior employees their preferred 
shifts, violating established collective bargaining rights. Thus, the Court found an “undue hardship” in 
accommodating a religion in which not all employees participated.
279 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 25, at 338.
280 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
281 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
282 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 38; see Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 
(1984) (“[I]n upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids race discrimination in public 
accommodations, we emphasized that its fundamental object was to vindicate the deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments. That stigmatizing injury, 
and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering 
discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.”) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).
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tolerated by the legal regime can infringe as well.283 Granting a narrow religious liberty 
claim to religious houses of worship would not impede on current antidiscrimination laws, 
but an overbroad exemption could grow to do that in the future. 
B. Advocate for a Narrower Construction of RFRA’s Reach
Outside of the detention context, the intersection of RFRA and immigration is, to date, 
quite small.284 Lower courts have shown that they will not just rubberstamp RFRA claims 
in the immigration context.285 They do, however, indicate a way to advocate for a narrow-
ing of RFRA’s overbroad reach. 
In a case involving a removal proceeding, the Ninth Circuit rejected the petitioners’ 
First Amendment and RFRA claims based on the argument that the requirements for the 
defense of cancellation of removal286 (which requires showing “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, such as a child who is a U.S. citizen or legal per-
manent resident) burdened them as devout Catholics who were unable to conceive a child 
due to the Church’s teachings that frowned upon in vitro fertilization.287 The Court found 
that since the petitioners had not shown they opposed adoption on religious grounds, their 
lack of a qualifying relative was not due to their religious beliefs.288 Additionally, the Court 
found that the statute could not have placed pressure on the petitioners to modify their re-
ligious beliefs due to the fact that they did not have a child that would suffer “exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship.”289 The Court further noted: “No sensible person would 
abandon his religious precepts to have a child in the hope that the child would be so very 
ill or learning disabled as to come within the small number of children as to whom ‘excep-
283 Tebbe, Religion and Marriage, supra note 22, at 38.
284 See Scott D. Pollock, Immigration Law vs. Religious Freedom: Using the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act to Challenge Restrictive Immigration Laws and Practices, 12 rutGers J. l. & reliGion 295, 
311, 337 (2011).
285 See Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2012); Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
286 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012).
287 Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
288 Id.
289 Id.
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tional and extremely unusual hardship’ can be shown.”290 
Another case dismissed the RFRA challenge to the United States Citizenship and Im-
migration Services (USCIS) regulation that makes it more difficult for non-citizen reli-
gious workers to obtain legal permanent resident (LPR) status than it is for other, secular 
workers. Religious workers must undergo a two-step process, which might cause adminis-
trative delays forcing workers to leave the U.S., while secular workers have just a one-step 
process.291 The Court found the burden of possibly having to leave was due to the terms 
of their temporary visa status, not their religion, and that the USCIS process did not force 
workers to choose between exercising their religion and obtaining a government benefit or 
avoiding civil or criminal penalty.292
In attempts to resist a broad reading of RFRA that would put a plethora of govern-
ment laws and regulations at risk, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted RFRA as requiring 
that successful claims show that they will lose a government benefit (Sherbert) or suffer 
a governmentally imposed penalty (Yoder) if they practice their religion.293 Another way 
to further narrow RFRA is to actually evaluate the substantiality of the burden, something 
Justice Alito completely failed to do in Hobby Lobby. Pre-Smith precedent mandates courts 
evaluate the substantiality of a burden. There is no substantial burden if the government ac-
tion does not coerce an individual to violate his or her religious beliefs or deny the “rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens”—even if “the challenged Government 
action would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual ful-
fillment according to their own religious beliefs.”294 This type of reading of RFRA could 
potentially honor religious sanctuary claims—a criminal conviction under the INA for har-
boring would certainly qualify as a government-imposed penalty. Houses of worship offer-
ing sanctuary could, in good faith, claim a sincerely held religious belief to help vulnerable 
290 Id. at 966–67.
291 Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2012); 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B) (2018).
292 Id. at 486–87.
293 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under RFRA, a 
‘substantial burden’ is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of 
their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious 
beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder).”); Pollock, supra note 284, at 315. The Ninth 
Circuit has reaffirmed this understanding of RFRA post-Hobby Lobby in Oklevueha Native American Church 
of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Oklevueha Native 
Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 510, 196 L. Ed. 2d 406 (2016).
294 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
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populations like undocumented immigrants. And this understanding of RFRA would not 
reach claims like those in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which seek to limit the reach of generally 
applicable antidiscrimination laws concerning public accommodations. 
C. Evaluate the Sincerity of Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs 
It is true that courts cannot question the reasonableness of a religious belief. However, 
courts could and should question whether a specific claimant truly believes the practice is 
religious in nature. 
Courts have had no issues judging the sincerity of an incarcerated person’s religious 
beliefs in the RLUIPA context: “[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a 
prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic . 
. . . the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religi-
osity.”295 Courts have also not had issues judging the sincerity of the religious beliefs of 
conscientious objectors from conscripted military service,296 holding that, “any fact which 
casts doubt on the veracity of the registrant is relevant.”297 Claims for religious exemptions 
from drug laws have historically been subject to more skepticism than other claims.298 The 
bankruptcy code, too, guards against fraudulent transfers of large pre-petition donations to 
religious organizations.299 To evaluate the validity of a donation in question, courts must 
295 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“Further, prison officials may appropriately 
question whether a prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic. 
Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed 
religiosity”).
296 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 3806 (West 2018) (exempting from service anyone who “by reason of religious 
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form”); United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“[W]hile the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant 
question whether it is ‘truly held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every 
case. It is, of course, a question of fact.”).
297 Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1955). 
298 In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito cited to United States v. Quaintance, a case in which the founding 
members of the Church of Cognizance, which teaches that marihuana is “a deity and sacrament” raised 
RFRA in defense to criminal drug prosecution. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014) 
(citing United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718–19 (10th Cir. 2010)). The Tenth Circuit rejected the 
RFRA claim, holding that the evidence strongly suggested the defendant’s marihuana dealings stemmed from 
“commercial or secular motives rather than sincere religious conviction.” Quaintance, 608 F.3d. at 722.
299 The Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(2) (2012), 
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judge whether the contribution was motivated by sincere religious belief and not ulterior, 
secular goals. And in the prosecution of the religious officials during the original sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s, the government refused to honor the defendants’ claims that their 
sanctuary was religiously motivated, insisting the movement’s motivation was political 
instead.300
The RFRA should work the same way as the RLUIPA and conscientious objections 
to military service. Sanctuary claims should survive this inquiry. The dangerous nature of 
risking a violation of federal criminal law and the extensive support that shelter offers is 
evidence of the true sincerity of the belief. Any evidence that a belief is not sincere should 
be presented and evaluated, too.301 Courts have plenty of experience weighing evidence and 
judging credibility through objective analysis. Looking for any secular interests, potential 
discrimination (as evidenced by the claimant’s behavior), and inconsistencies with stated 
beliefs can help courts weigh the questions of fact on sincerity. There is no reason courts 
cannot undertake this analysis in the RFRA context as well. Determining where to draw the 
line on “honest conviction[s]” is a role the Court has played with religion for decades.302
CONCLUSION
RFRA was never intended to create new rights for any religious practice.303 However, in 
the years since its passing in 1993, it has been expanded considerably by the Court. To be 
protects smaller donations from creditors, but “Congress left § 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code intact, 
allowing the avoidance of any transfer, regardless of size, when made with ‘actual intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud.’” Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby 
Lobby, 67 stan. l. rev. online 59, 62 (2014).
300 See Colbert, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
301 Neither the majority nor the petitioner in Hobby Lobby questioned the sincerity of the companies’ 
religious beliefs. 134 S. Ct. at 2779. It might have been a question worth asking, though, as evidence came 
to light after oral arguments, but prior to the decision, that Hobby Lobby invested more than $73 million 
through its retirement plans in funds with stakes in contraception manufacturers. See Molly Redden, Hobby 
Lobby’s Hypocrisy: The Company’s Retirement Plan Invests in Contraception Manufacturers, mother 
Jones (April 1, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/hobby-lobby-retirement-plan-invested-
emergency-contraception-and-abortion-drug-makers/ [https://perma.cc/8K7Q-2U63].
302 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ 
whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)).
303 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 139 Cong. Rec. 26178 (statement 
of Sen. Kennedy)). 
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sure, there are more progressive arguments to be made about whether RFRA is constitu-
tional at all,304 but, given the makeup of the current Court, these challenges do not seem like 
winnable propositions. So advocates must work inside the existing religious liberty frame-
work. Many of the same progressive groups interested in reproductive rights, antidiscrim-
ination in general, and LGBTQ equality specifically also support immigrants’ rights, both 
for the documented and undocumented. There is a natural inclination to want to support 
the plight of immigrants targeted by the Trump administration. The sanctuary some houses 
of worship have chosen to offer furthers this goal. However, if it comes to a legal chal-
lenge, progressive groups should carefully evaluate any claims of religious liberty made in 
the name of sanctuary. RFRA morphed into a sword for discrimination precisely because 
Congress blindly signed off on the overbroad idea of religious exemptions generally. The 
current sanctuary movement should take care not to make the same mistake.
RFRA has the potential to become the next Lochner, shooting down federal statutes 
that are “meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual” and “undue influ-
ences with the liberty of person and freedom of contract.”305 Courts should not hesitate to 
evaluate the RFRA claims critically—even with a close look, claims like those of Denver’s 
First Unitarian Society and First Baptist, protecting Jeanette Vizguerra, have the chance to 
survive. 
304 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my 
opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a ‘law respecting an establishment of 
religion’ that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution . . . . the statute has provided the Church with 
a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed 
to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment”); Hamilton, Bad Public Policy, supra note 111, at 129 
n.3; Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of 
Powers, 56 mont. l. rev. 5, 6 (1995); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 98.
305  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1905).
